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PREFACE
During the more than two years of work as an instructor in the 
radar simulator of the Argentine Merchant Marine Academy, I became 
increasingly aware of the wide training applications of this type 
of simulators. My interest also extended to the possible use of 
radar simulators in the field of marine casualty investigations. By 
a fortunate coincidence, while these thoughts came to my mind, I 
was selected by the authorities of my country to take the course on 
Maritime Education and Training (Nautical Field) in the World Mari­
time University, which I consider fortunate because it gave me the 
opportunity to continue the analysis of that particular subject 
fulfilling at the same time part of the requirements of the Insti­
tution for the award of the M.Sc. degree.
I have developed this project conscious that I am not a pio­
neer in the field. Radar simulators have been used by a number of 
very experienced professionals to carry out the investigation of 
marine casualties. In this thesis I intend to make an objective 
analysis of the subject considering the different contributing ele­
ments, in an attempt to draw conclusions and provide gidelines 
which might be of help to all those who in one way or another are 
involved, or.may become involved, in marine casualty investigation 
procedures.
IX
Many people have contributed to making this thesis possible 
and it would be almost impossible to name them all. They assisted 
me in getting a better understanding of the subject and to carry 
out the research work. 1 am particularly indebted to Bo Hbgbom for 
the time he has willingly given and to Johan A. Klerk for his great 
encouragement and critical analysis of the project. Also, my grati­
tude to Johan Van Walen for his patient revision of the manuscript 
and valuable comments.
F. Hatzenbuhler
November 1985
1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Aim of the project
This study deals with one of the negative results of human 
activity which is marine accident occurrence, and the con­
sequent investigation.
Accepting the fact that despite all efforts, marine 
casualties still continue to occur, the aim of the project is 
to contribute to the reduction of accident frequency, spe­
cifically collisions at sea. A thorough analysis of the events 
which led to such a casualty and their causes, can enable mari­
time administrators to take measures which may prevent the 
repetition of the occurrence. In many cases, however, the first 
obstacle to this approach is the difficulty to ascertain the 
course of events. This is especially the case when the investi­
gation process is hampered by lack of evidence and/or contra­
dictory statements.
Technological developments in recent years have introduced 
a radical change in the maritime industry which has also resul­
ted in improved training facilities. Radar simulators in parti­
cular are nowadays found in a great number of maritime educa­
2tion and training institutes as well as in research centers. 
Such highly advanced training tools can be used in many appli­
cations and one in particular is analyzed in this project, that 
is the investigation of collisions at sea.
1.2 General definitions
So far, the terms "accident" and "casualty" have been 
used. Let us investigate into the terminology in order to cla­
rify the meaning of those words. A dictionary will give the 
following definitions of "accident":
"Sudden event or change occurring without intent 
or volition through carelessness, unawareness, 
ignorance or a combination of causes and produ­
cing an unfortunate result"
or
"An unintentional act, chance, misfortune, espe­
cially one causing injury or damage"
and for "casualty" :
"A person or thing that has failed, been injured 
or lost or destroyed as a result of uncontrol - 
lable circumstance or of some action"
From these definitions it can be concluded that both terms 
are suitable to describe an occurrence characterized by two
3important features:
(a) loss of control
(b) unfortunate consequences
Strictly speaking, however, the definition of casualty 
refers more to the person, injured or the thing damaged, while 
accident is always the event itself.
If we look into the wording used in different English 
speaking countries, it will be found that there is no common 
terminology and both terms are used with the same meaning. Cer­
tain authors prefer to define "casualty" as an occurrence which 
results in damage to property, while "accident" involves injury 
or death of people. In IMO the word casualty is used, whatsoe­
ver the consecuences of the occurrence are. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study both words will be accepted as synonyms 
and used as such.
The unfortunate results which form part of any accident, 
leave out of the definition those occurrences which could have, 
but did not, resulted in a casualty. Those cases will be refer­
red to as "incidents", defined in a dictionary as :
"A disturbance or other action likely to lead 
to grave consequences"
Incidents and accidents are occurrences which happen in 
any field of activities. A marine occurrence is defined as an 
incident or an accident related to the use or operation of a
A
ship. This is a very broad definition, and many countries have 
included in their legislation a clear specification of the 
cases which are considered marine occurrences. In this way, a 
clear jurisdiction is provided to the authorities who have to 
deal with those cases.
In this study, collisions at sea as well as groundings 
will be dealt with, and according to any definition, it is 
clear that they are special cases of marine accidents.
1.3 Why do accidents happen ?
It seems quite obvious that an accident occurs because 
something went wrong. But it is not so easy to specify what 
went wrong. All the publications dealing with this problem 
arrive at the conclusion that human error is the principal cau­
se of accidents, and that is true in essence. It might be 
argued, however, that in its broadest sense, any accident is 
due to human failure. People have been involved either in the 
design, construction, inspection, maintenance, repair or opera­
tion of any device or mechanism used. Therefore, when conside­
ring the human factor as cause of accidents, two important 
points must be considered :
(a) human factor has to be taken in its collective meaning
(b) human failure has its causes
On the other hand, it is also important to study human 
behaviour because this will help to understand the reasons for 
people doing things wrong.
5In certain cases there is an escape-way by attributing the 
cause of an accident to an "act of god" but even this can lead 
to endless discussions. It is certainly possible to attribute 
almost all accidents to human error, but a better approach 
would be to use more precise terms to describe the cause of an 
accident, such as :
(a) Environmental accion
(b) Technical failures
(c) Errors in design
(d) Internal or external communication problems
(e) Organization problems
(f) Lack of regulations
(g) Non-compliance with regulations
(h) Poor training
(i) Lack of information
(j) Misinterpretation or incomplete utilization of information
(k) Misjudgement
(l) Error
(m) Negligence
(n) Stress
1.A Is it possible to reduce the accident frequency ?
From a very pessimistic approach, it might be said that 
accidents are part of daily life and nothing can be done to 
avoid them. Then, with a good background in mathematics, it is 
enough to forecast statistically the number of casualties and 
later check the accuracy of those predictions, mainly for the 
benefit of mathematicians, insurance companies, etc. Fortunate­
6ly, however, there is a different approach to the problem, as 
many people think that something can be done in order to reduce 
the accident frequency. A large number of statistics also show 
that a lower accident frequency has been achieved after adequa­
te preventive measures have been taken. This in fact means that 
if the frequency dropped, a number of casualties have been 
avoided.
1.5 How can accidents be avoided ?
In order to decrease the casualty frequency, it is neces­
sary to reduce or eliminate the causes of casualties or "safety 
hazards". The expression "safety hazard" can be defined as a 
situation or condition that could, if left unattended, induce 
an incident or accident.
The best way of eliminating accidents would be to detect 
all safety hazards before putting anything into operation or 
establishing any procedure, and thus achieve 100 % safety. It 
can easily be understood that it is almost impossible to arrive 
at this solution , as there will always be a margin of uncer­
tainty in the operation of any system which is beyond the con­
trol of the designer. On the other hand, the economic factor 
plays an important role when the reduction of safety hazards 
implies an important increase of costs. Nevertheless, there are 
examples of activities where safety is given a very high prio­
rity. In air traffic, for instance, impressive efforts have 
been made to reduce safety hazards to a minimum, and the suc­
cess can be measured through the very low accident rate. This 
can be attributed to the nature of that particular means of
7transport, in which the elimination of accidents is a key to 
profitable business.
A second way to reduce safety hazards is by learning from 
experience, after an accident actually occurred. By this we are 
again accepting that casualties will continue to occur and 
unfortunately there are strong reasons to believe that this is 
true. But it must be remembered that the objective is to reduce 
the rate of occurrences.
Whenever an accident occurs, and depending on the drama- 
tism and consequences of the event, a natural reaction will be 
that a number of questions arises .They will include when, whe­
re, why, how and who. The reasons for asking these questions 
vary according to the interests of the people concerned. The 
media have to provide as many details as possible, especially 
those that produce greater impact in the public. The general 
public will be interested for reasons of curiosity. In case of 
injuries or death, relatives will be specially concerned. Those 
who are financially involved, or may suffer any consecuence, 
will be particularly interested. Last but not least the autho­
rities who have to deal with the occurrence will certainly 
intervene and take the necessary steps to try to clarify the 
situation.
By this approach, and as it has often been demonstrated in 
practice, accidents must occur before safety measures are 
taken. The maritime field is not an exception to this rule, as 
a few examples can show ;
8(a) An amazingly large number of overloaded British ships had 
to sink before Samuel Plimsoll could convince the British 
Parliament to issue in 1876 the Merchant Shipping Act 
requiring to mark the deck line and the permissible draft. 
As a matter of fact Plimsoll gave public and parliamentary 
expression to the information provided by James Hall, a 
ship owner who had fought continuously for load line legis­
lation from 1869 onwards. Legislation on this matter can be 
traced as early as 1288 in the Hanseatic Leage. The British 
Act of 1876 didn't even specify where the so called Plim­
soll mark should be. Still 54 years had to pass before the 
first International Load Line Conference was held, in 1930, 
in order to set internationally agreed standards.
(b) The British passenger liner "Titanic" sank on April 15, 
1912, during her maiden voyage, after stricking an iceberg 
about 95 miles south of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. 
The vessel had been considered unsinkable, but did sink, 
however, with a loss of more than 1500 lives. The liner 
"Californian", stopped less than 20 miles away, could have 
aided to salve many lives, had her radio operator been on 
duty. As a result of the accident, safety measures were 
sped up and the first International Convention for Safety 
of Life at Sea was called in London in 1913. The Convention 
drew up rules requiring that every ship have lifeboat space 
for each person embarked. The Titanic had only 1178 boat 
spaces for the 2224 persons aboard. The Convention also 
required that lifeboat drills be held during each voyage, 
and a 24-hour radio watch. This Convention never entered 
into force due to the out-break of World War I, but was the
9base for future SOLAS Conventions.The International Ice 
Patrol was also established to warn ships of icebergs on 
the North Atlantic routes.
(c) The "Morro Castle", a passenger ship with accommodation for 
490 passengers, caught fire during the last part of her 
journey from Havana to New York on September 8, 1934. The 
vessel was carrying 316 passengers and 232 crew members, 
and as a result of the tragedy, 124 people lost their 
lives. The luxurious vessel was constructed with large 
quantities of highly combustible linings and furnishings in 
all accommodations. These characteristics, together with 
the lack of training and organization of the crew, contri­
buted to the rapid spread out of the fire, which became 
uncontrollable in a short time and led to the tragic conse­
quences mentioned. After this casualty, substantial changes 
were introduced in the U.S. legislation in order to improve 
safety standards on board ships.
(d) Collisions occurring in converging areas and in areas where 
the density of traffic is high, resulted in suggestions for 
the adoption of some kind of separation. The first recom­
mended routeing scheme was established for the Dover Strait 
in 1967 and many others followed. The International Regula­
tions for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea include the 
rules applicable to vessels using Traffic Separation Sche­
mes adopted by IMO. Those rules do not represent a guaran­
tee of absolute safety and as a matter of fact it is dis­
cussed whether their application might result, in certain 
circumstances, in a greater risk. Amendments will probably
10
introduced in the future. Nevertheless, the adoption of 
regulations concerning • routeing schemes represent a major 
step forward in the prevention of marine occurrences.
(e) On March 18, 1967, the "Torrey Canyon", a super-tanker ful­
ly loaded with more than 100,000 tons of crude oil, ran 
aground on the Seven Stones rocks off the British coast. 
The south-west coasts of England and northern coasts of 
France where menaced by the oil spillage. Long before, pol­
lution experts had been concerned with the possible con­
sequences of the increasingly larger tankers running 
aground or colliding. The Torrey Canyon stranding put the 
world face to face with a massive marine pollution resul­
ting from a shipping casualty. It showed that such acci­
dents can have serious effects upon the environment and 
marine life, damaging resources such as fisheries and tou­
rism for long periods. The case helped to speed up the fur­
ther development of international regulations for the pre­
vention of marine pollution as well as provisions related 
to pollution damage liability and compensation.In this con­
text, the International Convention Relating to Interven­
tions on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution, adopted 
in 1969 , can be mentioned. In addition, four international 
compensation schemes were developed during the post-Torrey 
Canyon period, which are known as CLC 1969, TOVALOP 1969, 
FUND 1971 and CR15TAL 1971.
1.6 Conclusion
As it has been mentioned, after an accident has been
11
reported the Government authorities will take action, usually 
in the form of some kind of investigation. The procedures and 
objectives vary from country to country, according to what has 
been specified in each particular legislation. If enough empha­
sis is put on the determination of the cause or causes of the 
accident, then as a consequence safety measures can be taken in 
order to make such a casualty less likely to happen again in 
the future. In too many cases, the accident itself works as a 
catalyzer to push forward safety measures which might have been 
taken at an earlier stage to prevent the occurrence.
The field of accident investigation is extremely ample and 
covers all human activities. This study only deals with marine 
accident investigation, specifically cases of collision at sea 
and the possibility of using radar simulators as valuable tools 
during the investigation. A general revision of marine accident 
investigation is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS
2.1 Purposes and objectives
Marine casualty investigation (or marine accident investi­
gation) may be defined as a procedure aimed at determining the 
facts, conditions and circumstances relating to a marine acci­
dent. There are two main aspects to consider. First, the imme­
diate reasons for carrying out the investigation, and second, 
its final objectives. The main purposes of the investigation 
can be stated as follows:
(a) find out facts
(b) collect all relevant information
(c) determine the most probable course of events
The objectives of the investigation differ considerably 
from country to country, in accordance with each particular 
legislation, and can vary from purely penal systems to safety 
promoting systems. The following main objectives can be iden­
tified:
(a) determine cause relationship
(b) recommend safety measures
(c) establish fault and take disciplinary action
(d) apportion liability
Objectives (a) and (b) are very closely linked, as effec­
tive prevention measures can only be taken when a thorough 
investigation of the accident is carried out establishing as 
accurately as possible the reasons why that particular accident 
happened.
It can be said that marine accident investigation is a 
complex of activities and that it is very much related to the 
traditions of each country. In some legislations very specific 
rules have been established, a detailed analysis of which is 
beyond the scope of this study. A broad description of the 
investigation procedure and the work of international bodies on 
the subject will be given, emphasizing those aspects which are 
important for the purpose of this project.
2.2 The investigation procedure
Regardless of the objectives, the common practice adopted 
in most maritime countries is a system which in many cases is 
divided in two stages and that will be briefly outlined.
After the marine accident has been reported and it is 
decided that it will be investigated, an officer is appointed 
by the Governmental authority concerned in order to carry out 
what is generally known as a preliminary investigation or pre­
liminary inquiry. The investigating officer must proceed as 
soon as possible to the scene of the casualty or a convenient
13
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site, in order to gather the necessary information. His duties 
will include the inspection of all premises' and objects which 
appear to be requisite for the purpose of the inquiry, the exa­
mination of all persons he thinks necessary and the collection 
of whatever other evidence which can be obtained, such as 
charts, books, papers and other documents. At the end of the 
inquiry, the officer will prepare a report containing a full 
statement of the case and his conclusions. This report may also 
include his recommendations for avoidance of repetition of the 
occurrence as well as action to be taken against licences held 
by persons involved. In many cases this preliminary inquiry is 
of confidential nature, but there is no common rule establi­
shed. The findings, therefore, may be published or kept restric­
ted. Based upon such report, sent to the appropriate Minister 
or other authority, it is decided whether a formal investiga­
tion should be held, which then would be the second step of the 
procedure. The reasons for holding a formal investigation may 
be of different nature including, among others, factors such 
as:
(a) the preliminary inquiry is not considered sufficient
(b) serious damage or loss of life occurred
(c) licences of the master, of any officer or of the pilot 
might be suspended or cancelled
(d) the lessons which can be learnt merit a deeper investiga­
tion
If it is decided to carry out a formal investigation, 
again an investigating officer or an investigating board will 
be appointed. Under certain legislations, this formal invest!-
15
gation has the character of a public inquiry. As a result of 
this investigation, a full report shall be produced. This 
report contains the description of the case,the conclusions, 
and the recommendations for proper action. It may include dis­
ciplinary action against the master, officers, pilot or other 
persons involved in the accident. Under certain legislations 
the report is made available to anyone and it can even be used 
in subsequent civil procedures.
Due to the international nature of shipping, it often hap­
pens that a flag State must conduct investigations outside its 
territory. Conflicts may arise when ships of different flags 
are involved, or when coastal States investigate casualties 
involving foreign flag vessels. In many cases, the accident 
which has to be investigated occurs within the jurisdiction of 
another State. The State in which the accident occurs will car­
ry out its own investigation as it is not usual to conduct a 
joint inquiry. This problem has been recognized and considered 
at international level, as it will be analyzed further on in 
this chapter.
An aspect which has just been mentioned and can not be 
neglected in any accident, is the question of civil liability. 
This legal proceeding is aimed at establishing liability, gene­
rally for insurance purposes, and the parties will be all those 
who have suffered losses as a result of the casualty. In a col­
lision between two vessels, for instance, it is necessary to 
apportion fault between the ships involved. There may be a 
negotiated solution to civil liability disputes, and if not, 
the case will be taken to court. It is found that in many
16
countries the proceedings related to civil liability are total­
ly separated from the inquiry conducted by the Government, 
although no common rule can be drawn.
The determination of the course of events prior to a col­
lision is the main point in this study. Some characteristics of 
marine accident investigation which are specially important 
will be analyzed.
2.2.1 Composition of the investigating body
In order to conduct the official investigation of a 
marine accident, an investigating body has to be appoin­
ted, and its jurisdiction and competency must be clearly 
established in the national legislation. In those cases 
in which the procedure is divided into a preliminary 
inquiry and a formal investigation, if the latter is 
required, the common practice is to appoint an official 
to conduct the preliminary inquiry, while the formal 
investigation will be carried out by an investigating 
board or court. In any case, an investigator in charge 
will be responsible for the planification, organization, 
co-ordination, conduction and supervision of the investi­
gation.
Marine accidents cover a wide spectre of cases and 
not two casualties are alike. Therefore, the size and 
scope of the investigation must be directly related to 
the nature of the accident. In certain cases, the causes 
of the casualty become clear at an early stage and no
17
further inquiry is necessary. On the other hand, more 
than often the causes are not readily apparent. Evidence 
may be lost or destroyed during the accident, or even by 
deliberate act; witnesses may not be available, or their 
statements contradictory, and so forth. These cases 
represent sometimes a formidable challenge to the inve­
stigator in charge, and the best way to tackle the prob­
lem is to organize a team of investigators possessing the 
expertise relevant to the type of accident in question. 
This team can be divided in groups if an extensive inve­
stigation is required and those groups might be in charge 
of the following areas of investigation:
(a) nautical
(b) technical
(c) environment
(d) medical and human factor
(e) examination of witnesses
(f) evacuation, search and rescue, and fire fighting
It should be clear that the groups have to be estab­
lished according to the type and extent of the investi­
gation. The main purpose of such a group system is to make 
use of the specialized knowledge and practical experience 
of the participants in the investigation. These groups 
must collect facts, gather evidence and if necessary, con­
duct tests and trials. A close cooperation among groups is 
required, and the exchange of information may be vital for 
the success of the investigation. The investigator in 
charge is responsible for co-ordinating the work of the
18
groups and supervising the collection of all reports in 
order to prepare the final composite report.
2.2.2 Examination of witnesses
The statements of witnesses constitute one of the 
fundamental pillars of the investigation. On the other 
hand, the examination represents a conflictive aspect. 
The question which arises is how open and spontaneous can 
one expect a witness to be if he knows that the evidence 
he should give might expose his fault or be used in one 
way or another against himself.
As it has been mentioned earlier, the systems vary 
from country to country. While certain Administrations 
conduct inquiries mostly to determine blame and impose 
penalties, others exercise no disciplinary jurisdiction 
at all and this matter is dealt with in a separate pro­
ceeding. From the safety point of view, a marine occur­
rence investigation system totally independent of any 
disciplinary process has certainly many advantages over 
any other system. On the one hand, the investigators do 
not have to deal with duties of safety and enforcement at 
the same time and on the other hand, this approach may 
result in a less defensive attitude of the witnesses. 
This is especially the case if the confidentiality of 
statements is guaranteed and the witnesses are told so 
beforehand. However, such a system should not prevent the 
investigators from including in their reports findings 
from which it may be concluded that faults have been com­
19
mitted and therefore disciplinary action might be taken 
afterwards.
2.2.3 Independence of the investigating body
Bearing in mind that one of the objectives of marine 
accident investigation is safety promotion, the impartia­
lity of the investigating body is analyzed here.
In many Administrations, the same authority respon­
sible for the maritime regulations and their enforcement, 
is the investigating authority in case of accidents. In 
those cases, it is argued that there is a potential conf­
lict of interest. The investigator may arrive at the 
conclusion that there are safety deficiencies in the 
regulatory requirements or in their enforcement, and it 
can be asked whether he will be willing to criticize his 
colleagues or his superiors. Therefore, a tendency to 
minimize or even to avoid mentioning weaknesses within 
the organization can be expected.
Total independence of the investigating authority 
can obviously be never achieved as it has to find 
its place somewhere within the administration. Howe­
ver, by separating the investigating body from the 
authority directly responsible for the implementa­
tion of regulations, the impartiality mentioned can 
be better guarantied.
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2.2.4 Dissemination of reports
As mentioned , a report resulting from a marine 
casualty investigation will usually contain recommen­
dations if that is felt necessary in order to take safety 
measures. Sometimes these recommendations will lead to 
changes in the regulations which may well imply a long 
process.
Another way of taking advantage of casualty investi­
gations, besides making recommendations, is to make the 
findings easily available to the people who can learn 
safety lessons. The publication of investigation reports 
is as important when human error is found to be the 
direct cause of the casualty as when system deficiencies 
are involved. Reports which are made public do not have 
to include names of persons involved, but should include 
a factual narrative of the events, an objective analysis 
of the evidence and findings on contributing factors and 
causes of the marine accident. Should the information get 
into the hands of seafarers, shipbuilders, shipowners, 
ship operators and training institutes, each of them may 
benefit from the lessons learnt.
2.3 Work of the International Maritime Organization in relation to 
the investigation of maritime accidents
IMO started its work in January 1959 after entry into for­
ce of its Convention in 1958. Prior to the amendment of the 
Convention in May 1982, the name of the Organization was
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Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). 
In accordance with its objectives, the Organization gave atten­
tion, among other subjects, to measures and problems relating 
to marine casualty investigations. The principal treaty provi­
sions on the subject are contained in the SOLAS Conventions, 
the 1966 International Convention on Load Lines and the Inter­
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978. The 1948 SOLAS Con­
vention, responsibility for which was assumed by the Organiza­
tion in 1959, contained a provision requiring States parties to 
conduct investigations into casualties. This provision has been 
retained in successive SOLAS Conventions. Similar provisions 
are contained in the International Convention on Load Lines, 
1966 and in the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973/1978. All three have been transcri­
bed in Annex 2.1 (page 25), Annex 2.2 (page 26),and Annex 2.3 
(page 27), respectively.
The matter was considered in 1961 by the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) which arrived at the conclusion that the infor­
mation available to the Organization could not be considered as 
providing "sufficient conclusions or guidance towards the 
object of the SOLAS Regulations on the subject" but it did pro­
vide some help "in establishing clues to the main and most com­
mon causes of marine casualties".
In 1967 a Legal Committee was established in the Organiza­
tion and this body submitted to the Assembly a draft resolution 
on participation in official inquiries into marine casualties. 
The Torrey Canyon accident was the main factor which sped up
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adoption of the resolution A. 173 (Annex 2.4, page 28). One of 
the objectives was to encourage administrations to work towards 
more uniform practices in the field of marine casualty investi­
gation, particularly in case of oil pollution.
In 1975, the MSC considered a proposal regarding the imp­
lementation of the marine casualty provisions of the 1960 SOLAS 
and 1966 Load Lines Conventions. The proposal stated that there 
was a need for better feed-back to the Organization of informa­
tion about casualties and "a better indication that Administra­
tions were implementing their obligations under the Conventions 
to conduct investigations into casualties". As a result, reso­
lution A.322 was adopted in November 1975. This resolution has 
been transcribed in Annex 2.5 (page 31). In conformity with the 
request, the MSC established a procedure applying to casualties 
involving ships of not less than 1600 grt which were a total 
loss and to casualties involving ships of not less than 500 grt 
involving loss of life. On the basis of LLoyd's Quarterly 
Casualty Returns and the monthly casualty lists issued by the 
Liverpool Underwriters Association, the Secretariat requests 
relevant administrations to submit reports on serious casual­
ties to the Organization. Once a year the MSC receives a list 
of serious casualties upon which no reports have been received 
and a list containing extracts from the reports provided by the 
flag States. Where appropriate, casualty reports are brought to 
the attention of the Committee's Sub-Committees for further 
consideration and action. The Tanker Casualty Data Scheme is 
also a follow-up action. Data about tanker casualties are col­
lected and analysed annually for further submission to the 
apropriate Sub-Committees.
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In 1978, a Member Government pointed out that "in the case 
of casualties involving ships of different flag States official 
investigations are often hampered by the fact that some Admi­
nistrations are, for legal reasons, reluctant or unable to pro­
vide detailed information to foreign Administrations". The MSC 
agreed on a recommendation on the subject and the Assembly 
adopted resolution A.440 (Annex 2.6, page 33).
It must be borne in mind that international Conventions 
bind legally Contracting Parties, while resolutions are only 
recommendations made by the Organization which may be accepted 
or not. Whith regard to the Conventions mentioned before, it 
should be noted that as at 31 March 1985, 114 States have 
accepted either SOLAS 1960 or SOLAS 1974 Conventions and 102 
States have accepted the International Convention on Load 
Lines, 1966, while as at 31 December 1984, 37 States have 
accepted either the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, 1973 or the Convention as amended by 
the Protocol of 1878.
The matter of inquiries into marine casualties at an 
international level still requires considerable attention in 
order to solve the different problems involved and the Inter­
national Maritime Organization is expected to continue dealing 
with the many aspects of the problem, in its role of maritime 
safety promotion.
2.4 Work of other international bodies
In the context of marine casualty investigation, two other
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international treaties include provisions on the subject;
(a) International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 147, 
1976, concerning minimum standards in merchant ships. This 
Convention entered into force in November 28, 1981 and the 
relevant article'has been included as Annex 2.7 (page 35) 
in this chapter.
(b) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, 
which is not yet in force, includes a provision under the 
duties of the flag State. The article has been transcribed 
in Annex 2.8 (page 36).
2.5 Conclusion
The importance of marine accident investigation has been 
recognized and most maritime countries have set up the neces­
sary infrastructure to conduct inquiries, although there is 
still a lack of harmonization at international level on the 
subject. In this chapter, a general description of marine acci­
dent investigation and its main features has been given. In the 
next chapter, radar simulators will be dealt with in order to 
establish a link with the accident investigation process.
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Annex 2.1
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON LOAD LINES, 1966
Article 23 
Casualties
(1) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of 
any casualty occurring to ships for which it is responsible and 
which are subject to the provisions of the present Convention 
when it judges that such an investigation may assist in deter­
mining what changes in the Convention might be desirable.
(2) Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organiza­
tion with the pertinent information concerning the findings of 
such investigations. No reports or recommendations of the Org- 
ganization based upon such information shall disclose the iden­
tity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner fix 
or imply responsibility upon any ship or person.
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Annex 2.2
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
PART C - CASUALTIES
Regulation 21 
Casualties
(a) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of 
any casualty occurring to any of its ships subject to the pro­
visions of the present Convention when it judges that such an 
investigation may assist in determining what changes in the 
present Regulations might be desirable.
(b) Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organiza­
tion with pertinent information concerning the findings of such 
investigations. No reports or recommendations of the Organiza­
tion based upon such information shall disclose the identity or 
nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner fix or imp­
ly responsibility upon any ship or person.
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Annex 2.3
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION FROM 
SHIPS, 1973, AS AMENDED BY THE PROTOCOL OF 1978
ARTICLE 12 
Casualties to ships
(1) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of 
any casualty occurring to any of its ships subject to the pro­
visions of the Regulations if such casualty has produced a 
major deleterious effect upon the marine environment.
(2) Each Party to the Convention undertakes to supply the Organiza­
tion with information concerning the findings of such investi­
gation, when it judges that such information may assist in 
determining what changes in the present Convention might be
desirable.
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Annex 2.4
RESOLUTION A.173(ES.IV) 
28 November 1968
PARTICIPATION IN OFFICIAL INQUIRIES 
INTO MARITIME CASUALTIES
"The Assembly,
Noting that there is a variation in the practices of Member 
States with regard to official inquiries into maritime casualties, 
and other proceedings directly consequent upon such inquiries.
With a view to ensuring that States seriously affected by or 
having a substantial interest in maritime casualties, particularly 
where oil pollution to their coasts has resulted, shall have an 
opportunity of being represented at inquiries into, or other such 
proceedings relating to, such casualties, and
Desiring to encourage international unification of practice 
in relation to such inquiries and proceedings.
Recommends to governments that if a State other than the Sta­
te of the flag is known to have been seriously affected by or to 
have a substantial interest in a maritime casualty occurring to a 
ship of the flag State (particularly where the coast of that other
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State has been polluted by oil as a result of the casualty):
(1) (a) the State of the flag should,unless an inquiry is held
by that State as a matter of course, consult with that 
other State as to the holding of an inquiry into the 
casualty by one or the other of the States, complying 
with the provisions of sub-paragraph (2);
(b) if such an inquiry is held as a matter of course by 
the flag State, the other State should be informed of 
its time and place;
(2) such an inquiry should be so conducted that, subject to 
the national rules relating to the special conditions 
under which inquiries are held in camera,
(a) the public is permitted to attend; and
(b) arrangements are made which would , subject to the 
discretion of the authority holding the inquiry, allow 
a representative of the other State concerned to 
attend and participate in the inquiry at least to the 
extend of:
(i) questioning witnesses or causing questions to be 
put through the authority concerned; and
(ii) viewing all relevant documents;
(3) if an inquiry is held by a State seriously affected or
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having a substantial interest, a representative of the 
State of the flag should be given similar facilities.
If one or other of the conditions of sub-paragraph (2) above 
cannot be complied with at the inquiry itself, this recommendation 
shall be treated as being complied with if the condition not pre­
viously satisfied is satisfied in proceedings directly consecuent 
upon the inquiry. Nothing in this recommendation shall affect or 
apply to the holding of any preliminary or informal inquiry or any 
other proceedings.
A State shall not be treated for the purposes of the recom­
mendation as being affected by or having a substantial interest in 
a maritime casualty by reason only that it is the flag State of one 
or two ships in a collision, nor should the fact that one or more 
of its nationals has a commercial interest in the ship or its cargo
in itself confer such an interest."
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Annex 2.5
RESOLUTION A.322(IX)
12 November 1975
THE CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO CASUALTIES
"The Assembly,
Noting Article 16(i) of the IMCO Convention concerning the 
functions of the Assembly,
Noting further the provisions of Regulation 21, Chapter I of 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960 
and Article 23 of the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 
which are intended to provide the Organization with pertinent 
information regarding the effectiveness of the Regulations.
Being aware of the provisions of Resolution A.173(ES.IV) con­
cerning participation in official inquiries into maritime casual­
ties.
Having considered the Report of the Maritime Safety Committee 
on its thirty-third session,
Draws attention to the obligations of Contracting Governments 
concerning the investigation of casualties set out in the above-
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mentioned Conventions.
Urges Contracting Governments to provide the Organization 
with relevant information regarding lessons to be learnt and conc­
lusions derived from the investigation of casualties.
Requests the Maritime Safety Committee to examine regularly 
such reports supplied by Contracting Governments and to recommend 
action as necessary.
Further requests the Maritime Safety Committee in consulta­
tion with the Secretariat to consider whether the Organization 
should take the initiative in listing serious casualties and reque­
sting Administrations to give information regarding the inquiries 
held into them and their findings and thereafter to take any 
appropriate action to this end."
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Annex 2.6
RESOLUTION A.440(XI) 
15 November 1979
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR INVESTIGATIONS 
INTO MARINE CASUALTIES
"The Assembly,
Recalling Article 16(i) of the Convention on the Inter-Go­
vernmental Maritime Consultative Organization concerning the func­
tions of the Assembly,
Considering Regulation 21 of Chapter I of the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, which requires 
Administrations to conduct an investigation of any casualty occur­
ring to any of its ships when it judges that such an investigation 
may assist in determining what changes in the requirements of the 
1974 SOLAS Convention might be desirable.
Noting that the Maritime Safety Committee has considered 
reports of investigations into serious marine casualties and has 
recognized the importance of free exchange of information between 
Governments and, in particular, the need for providing details of 
those casualties.
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Being aware that investigations into casualties, especially 
in the case of collisions, are often hampered by lack of exchange 
of information where ships under different flags are involved,
Having considered the recommendation made by the Maritime 
Safety Committee at its thirty-ninth session.
Urges Governments to co-operate on a mutual basis in investi­
gations into marine casualties and to exchange information freely 
for the purpose of a full appraisal of such casualties."
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Annex 2.7
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION CONVENTION No. 147, 1976 , CON­
CERNING MINIMUM STANDARDS IN MERCHANT SHIPS.
Article 2
(g) Each Member which ratifies this Convention undertakes to hold 
an official inquiry into any serious marine casualty involving 
ships registered in its territory, particularly those involving 
injury and/or loss of life, the final report of such inquiry 
normally to be made public.
36
Annex 2.8
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982
Part VII High Seas 
Section 1. General Provisions 
Article 94
Duties of the flag State
7. Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a sui­
tably qualified person or persons into every marine casualty or 
incident of navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying 
its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals 
of another State or serious damage to ships or installations of 
another State or to.the marine environment.
The flag State and the other State shall co-operate in the con­
duct of any inquiry held by that other State into any such mari­
ne casualty or incident of navigation.
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CHAPTER 3 
RADAR SIMULATORS
3.1 Simulation
From a technical point of view, simulation can be defined 
as a research or teaching technique designed to reproduce under 
test conditions various phenomena which are likely to occur 
under real conditions. The actual device utilized to carry out 
the simulation is called simulator and it can adopt many diffe­
rent configurations according to the objectives pursued. There­
fore, once established what has to be simulated and bearing in 
mind the objectives of the simulation, a suitable system must 
be designed and developed to produce the approximation of rea­
lity needed. Three main interactive components are present in 
simulation. Those components are shown in figure 3.1.
figure 3.1
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As it has been defined, simulation has two main practical 
applications, namely teaching and research.
3.2 Why simulation ?
Simulation has been introduced as an adequate solution to 
overcome a number of limitations posed by on-the-job training 
and as a valuable tool for research as well. Safety, cost, time 
and training control are four important factors to be taken 
into account when considering the advantages of using simula­
tors. Simulation allows to create hazardous situations in a 
safe environment, unusual conditions can be easily programmed 
and any situation can be repeated over and over at will. As an 
example, in navigation training nobody would put a ship in a 
hazardous situation in order to train somebody in anti-colli­
sion manoeuvres, while in a radar simulator such a situation 
can be programmed and repeated as many times as it may be 
necessary without any damage if a collision does occur. Simu­
lation techniques have also found a wide field of application 
in research, considering the factors mentioned before. In the 
maritime field, studies on vessel traffic management systems, 
port development, safety of navigation in critical areas and 
human behaviour are examples of contributions of simulation to 
the development of such a field of activities. Simulation, 
however, has its own limitations as no simulator, no matter how 
sophisticated it might be, can ever be a 100?o representation of 
real life. In training, the fact that safety is guarantied is 
an important constraint. In research, a number of assumptions 
will allways have a certain degree of uncertainty. Neverthe­
less, the achievement of the training objectives is more rela-
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ted to the validity of a simulator than its degree of realism. 
This aspect will be dealt with further on in this chapter in 
the context of radar simulators.
Therefore,simulation must be considered as a complement 
rather than a substitute of real life.
3.3 Marine simulators
The maritime community has been slow to accept simulation. 
However, simulation is used today in a wide spectre of acti­
vities and a fast development is taking place. This can be 
attributed to the technological advancement in recent years, 
especially in the field of data processing.
In an attempt to draw a broad classification of marine 
simulators they can be divided, according to the task they per­
form, into the following groups:
(a) Navigation simulators
(b) Cargo handling simulators
(c) Ship engine simulators
(d) Automation simulators
Furthermore, each group includes a number of applications 
and therefore can be divided into sub-groups. In this project, 
particular attention is given to radar simulators, which belong 
to group (a).
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3.4 Development of navigation simulators
The first simulators of this kind introduced as teaching 
tools have been the radar simulators, which were primarily 
aimed at training in the use of radar as an anti-collision aid. 
Later on, different features were incorporated such as coastli­
ne generation, VHF communication, fog signals, echo sounding 
and a variety of electronic positioning systems. Accordingly, 
the training objectives became more ample including radar navi­
gation, bridge procedures, 5AR training, passage planning and 
electronic navigation among others. These simulators are still 
known as radar simulators although certain manufacturers and 
institutes have changed the name into radar and navigation 
simulators or simply navigation simulators. The characteristics 
of such type of simulators will be dealt with in more detail 
further on in this chapter. An additional development consisted 
in the introduction of external vision by way of light spots, 
shadows, computer generated imagery (CGI) or other devices, 
thus providing the trainee with a view of the world through the 
windows of his bridge together with the radar screen picture. 
Full bridge lay-out is usually provided and in certain simula­
tors the bridge has been mounted on a moving platform. These 
simulators are called ship or ship handling simulators and have 
reached a high degree of sophistication. Their cost is also 
much higher than that of a radar simulator, and they require 
substantial building facilities for housing. On the other hand, 
ship handling simulators offer the possibility of training in 
ship manoeuvres to the extend of taking a vessel alongside in 
certain simulators. The field of research is also widened with 
this type of equipment.
A1
In addition to these full-task simulators, a number of 
part task simulators have been developed. The modular concept 
of simulation allows training in the use of individual naviga­
tion instruments, usually feeding real instruments with simula­
ted signals. By integrating part-task simulators, a complete 
ship handling simulator can be built.
A different approach to ship handling simulation is the 
recent introduction of micro-simulators. This type of simu­
lators present either a bird's eye view or a panoramic view of 
the situation on a graphic display such as a video display unit 
or the radar screen adapted for that purpose. Therefore, the 
trainee is presented with a reduced scale synthetic picture of 
the world which allows him to manoeuvre the ship in a fairway 
or in port. These simulators are less expensive than full scale 
simulators, but their validity as training aids is under dis­
cussion.
3.5 Radar simulators
As it has been mentioned earlier, radar simulators have 
been primarily designed for training in radar operation at sea, 
but further developments have included other navigation featu­
res extending the field of application of the simulation to the 
extend that there is a tendency to change the denomination of 
those simulators. A sharp distinction is made, however, when 
the simulator is provided with external view in which case it 
is called ship handling simulator due to the fact that the 
radar is no longer the main source of information of the envi­
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ronmental situation. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, 
all those simulators which use the radar as the main informa­
tion source about the ship's environment will be considered 
radar simulators.
Radar simulators, which began to be used in the 1950s, 
have become a common teaching tool in maritime colleges. The 
importance of radar simulators for radar training has been 
recognized at international level. At the International Con­
ference on Training and Certification of Seafarers, 1978, a 
recommendation on radar simulator training was approved as 
Resolution 18, which has been reproduced in Annex 3.1 (page 49) 
of this project. IMO has encouraged the installation of such 
simulators in nautical colleges and provides substantial 
technical assistance on this matter.
Figure 3.2 is a basic block diagram of a radar simulator.
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
"own ship"
figure 3.2
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The practical lay-out of the system includes:
(a) one or more of the so called "own ships", each of them 
being equipped with at least a radar set and the necessary 
instruments and controls to con the ship.
(b) a central processor unit, or decentralized micro-processors 
in more modern systems.
(c) an instructor station with the equipment needed to operate 
and monitor the system.
In addition to the hardware briefly described, the simula­
tor also requires for its operation two main elements:
(a) software to meet the requirements of the simulation.
(b) adequately trained instructors.
Such a general description is obviously not enough to spe­
cify a radar simulator, and less to conclude that valid results 
can be obtained using such a system.
The validity of simulation is a measure of the functional 
correspondence between the simulation and the reality which is 
being simulated. A simulator used for training is considered 
valid if the knowledge and skills acquired by the trainee are 
applicable in future practice. If used for research, the 
results obtained in the simulator should agree with those which 
would have been obtained had the research taken place in real 
life. It is very difficult, however, to classify a simulator as 
valid or non-valid, as the results depend not only on the capa­
bilities of the simulator itself but also on the instructor's
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skills , the training programmes and the trainee's skills as 
well. On the other hand, it is not always possible to compare 
research results obtained using a simulated man-machine-envi­
ronment system with real life experiments. Nevertheless, a lot 
of research has been done in the field of validity with results 
which can be considered satisfactory. An important factor to be 
taken into account is that the operator of a radar simulator, 
and a simulator in general, must fully know the capabilities 
and limitations of the system he is using in order to carry out 
thp type of training or research which leads to valid results.
So far, no international standards exist to specify the 
minimum requirements for a system to be considered as a radar 
simulator, but certain countries have established national 
requirements on that subject. Most of the radar simulators used 
worldwide have the following minimum characteristics:
(a) Hardware:
(1) Central processor unit or decentralized units.
(2) Instructor's console with facilities for exercise pre­
paration, execution and monitoring.
(3) graphic plotter (X-Y or digital plotter)
(4) Electronic exercise recording and playback device.
(5) Own ship stations, each including a console to control 
course and speed of the ship and display heading, 
speed, RPM, helm and rudder angle, and a standard radar 
display unit with reflection plotter.
(b) Software:
(1) Own ship manoeuvring models with realistic hydrodynamic
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behaviour in open eaters and responding to the types of 
ships selected by the user, plus programmable models.
(2) Digital and/or optical coastline generation.
(3) Target generation.
(4) Radar display data generation.
(5) Instructor's console data generation.
(6) Data generation for graphic plotter and electronic 
recording and playback device.
(c)’ Lay-out;
(1) Instructor's room.
(2) Own ship cubicles.
(3) Briefing and debriefing room.
(4) Central processor unit room.
It must be emphasized that the above mentioned list des- 
ribes the main minimum characteristics of most of the 
Lmulators in use. Many of them include a large number of addi- 
ional features such as shallow waters effects, communication 
acuities, navalds, ARPft radars, etc. The specifications vary 
cnnrdino to the objectives of the simulation and also follow
the technological advancements. Those specifications which have 
to be met for the purpose of the research proposed in this
paper will be analyzed in the next chapter.
An aspect which deserves special consideration, however, 
and that plays a very important role in the validation of radar
imulator use is the behaviour of the W ships. All radar
lmulators include mathematical models of the dynamic behaviour 
,f the "own" ships and certain simulators also Include a simp-
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lified model to control the movement of the targets. The models 
designed for the "own" ships accept as inputs bridge commands 
and environmental data. In response to these inputs the simula­
ted ship is expected to behave in a realistic manner, in accor­
dance with the operational conditions.
The bridge commands may include:
(a) Main engine orders.
(b) Bow and/or stern thrusters orders
(c) Helm orders.
The environmental influences may be:
(a) Wind.
(b) Tidal streams and currents.
(c) Waves.
(d) Shallow waters effects.
(e) Interaction with other ships.
(f) Towing lines.
(g) Anchoring forces.
(h) Mooring lines. >.
The extend to which the inputs listed are included in the 
models provided with different radar simulators depends on the 
type of ship simulated, the objectives of the simulation and 
the cost of the system.
There is no commonality among models used by different 
manufacturers, as a number of solutions can provide similar
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results, and in many cases a manufacturer develops his own 
model without disclosing the information. The complexity 
required is in direct relation to the purpose of the simula­
tion.For instance, a radar simulator used for manoeuvre trai­
ning in restricted waters requires a much more sophisticated 
mathematical model than the same system used for navigation 
training in open waters.
Different models have been adopted by manufacturers of 
radar simulators. In Appendix I of this project the mathemati­
cal and physical principles involved are dealt with.
Shiphandling simulators, which have to perform a number of 
manoeuvring tasks, require high accuracy of the mathematical 
models. As the requirements of radar simulators are not so 
stringent, simplified versions of the equations can be used 
with good results.
Whichever the mathematical model used for the "own" ships 
in a radar simulator, a number of coefficients and time con­
stants are included in the equations to simulate the behaviour 
of a particular ship. If the ship has been programmed by the 
manufacturer, the coefficients which do not represent environ­
mental conditions are included as fixed values in the system. 
On the other hand, if the simulator offers the posibility of 
programmable ships, the coefficients must be accordingly cho­
sen by the simulator user. In certain simulators, the range of 
validity of the behaviour of a specific ship can be extended 
by utilizing more than one set of equations, each set with its 
own coefficients, to describe the movement of the ship. Each
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set is used for a certain range of speeds.
3.6 Conclusion
Radar simulators are widely used today as a complement of 
navigation training on board. The field of application has 
grown as instructors have gained experience in the use of simu­
lators and with the progress in electronic technology. A logi­
cal consecuence has been the extension of the use of radar 
simulators into the field of research.
Having considered the main characteristics of the casualty 
investigation process as well as the most important features of 
radar simulation, the next step is to analyze the application 
of radar simulators in that field. This is the subject of the 
following chapter.
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Annex 3.1
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION 
OF SEAFARERS,1978
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE 
Resolution 18 
Radar Simulator Training
THE CONFERENCE,
RECOGNIZING the vital importance of adequate radar training 
with regard to the safety of life and property at sea and the pro­
tection of the environment,
CONSIDERING that some methods of instruction in the use of 
radar do not achieve the desired level of proficiency of masters 
and deck officers,
NOTING that the International Convention on Standards of Trai­
ning,Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, requires 
such officers to possess an adequate level of proficiency in ship 
operations under all conditions of service,
RESOLVES to recommend that radar simulator training be given to 
all masters and deck officers,
INVITES the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza- 
tibn to communicate this Resolution to all Governments invited to 
the Conference,
CALLS upon all Governments concerned to take due account of 
this Resolution as a matter of urgency.
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CHAPTER 4
RADAR SIMULATORS AND MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS
4.1 Introduction
Let's imagine a hypothetic situation in which two ships 
collide at sea, under conditions of restricted visibility. Both 
vessels have been detected in the respective radar screens. 
Despite this, the chain of events leads to a close quarters 
situation and ends up in a collision, with severe damage to 
both ships. An investigation into the casualty will commence 
and the first task of the investigator in charge is to try to 
establish the most probable course of events. All information 
is gathered including the evidence available and statements of 
witnesses. Based on that information, the situation preceding 
the accident is reconstructed and it is found that the colli­
sion could never have' occurred and a safe CPA resulted from the 
manoeuvres carried out by the watchkeeping officers. However, 
the accident did in fact take place, which implies that some­
thing is wrong in the original reconstruction based on the 
information gathered. A reassessment of the situation must be 
done on a recurrent basis making certain assumptions until a 
solution is found which best responds to the circumstances and 
actually ends in a collision. Such a situation is not applicab­
le to all the collisions which occur at sea, as many of them
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admit a straightforward reconstruction without any contradic­
tion, but more than often the investigator will have to face an 
arduous task trying to establish the real chain of events.
A good graphical way of reconstructing the accident, which 
has been universally adopted, is the representation on paper of 
the tracks followed by the vessels involved. This has been done 
by nautical experts in hundreds of cases, plotting manually on 
paper or in a nautical chart the respective positions of the 
vessels concerned based on course and speed as a function of 
time until the accident occurs. As a matter of fact, this has 
been the only solution available for a long time. Obviously, 
such manual plotting is not an easy task and when certain dis­
crepancies appear during the reconstruction, the graphic method 
can be especially tedious and time consuming, but these disad­
vantages had to be accepted as there was no alternative to the 
problem. In recent years, with the advent of digital computers 
and radar simulators as an application, an improved solution to 
the problem became available which takes advantage of the posi- 
bilities offered by such type of simulators. A number of cases 
have been put under test in radar simulators to help to estab­
lish the chain of events and the most probable cause or causes 
of the collision.
In this project, an analysis of this solution to the prob­
lem of collision reconstruction is made, establishing its 
advantages together with its limitations, and a systematic 
approach is suggested.
The first step is to identify the type of marine occurren-
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ces which can be subject to an investigation using a radar 
simulator and next the minimum specifications which such a 
simulator should comply with.
4.2 Marine occurrences subject to radar simulator analysis
4.2.1 Type
Radar simulators belong to the family of navigation 
simulators and therefore are applicable to situations in 
which the "own" ships are at sea performing navigational 
tasks. In fact, a radar simulator is a computarized posi­
tion fixing device which in addition generates the 
appropriate radar signals in correspondence with the 
movement of the "own" ships. Hence, the marine occurren­
ces which can be replayed using such a simulator are col­
lisions at sea or groundings. In this study the analysis 
will be limited to collisions, in which full advantage of 
the posibilities of radar simulation can be taken. Groun­
dings may involve a number of navigational problems inc­
luding identification of land marks and shallow waters 
effects, which represent a restriction to the use of a 
number of less sophisticated radar simulators. However, 
the possibility of a reconstruction in the simulator 
should not be ruled out before an analysis of the parti­
cular case is made, as such an analysis might show that 
at least part of the grounding case can be reconstructed 
in the simulator based on its characteristic as a dead 
reckoning device.
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A situation which has not been paid enough attention 
is that of a near miss, which fall in the category of 
incidents as defined in chapter 2 and that could also be 
investigated using simulation techniques. However, it is 
necessary to implement first a reporting system which has 
not been established yet. Therefore, it can be expected 
that such cases will be very uncommon.
4.2.2 Ship's environment
From the analysis of radar simulators made in the 
previous chapter, it is clear that such simulators repro­
duce conditions of restricted visibility, as normally the 
"own" ships have no windows, and if they are provided, it 
is only for the sake of fidelity of the simulated bridge 
without any useful information about the ship's environ­
ment. During radar training, the kind of exercises conduc­
ted in radar simulators are prepared under the assumption 
that’ the decision-making process is mainly based on the 
information obtained from the radar screen. This is equi­
valent to a situation in which the visibility is restric­
ted to the extent that any visual sighting of a ship 
occurs too late to take any avoiding action. This charac­
teristic suggests the type of collisions to be investiga­
ted, that is those which involve an extensive use of the 
radar as the main information source. In these cases, max­
imum benefit of radar simulation can be obtained because 
the reconstruction will include the radar picture seen on 
the bridge, which can be compared with the information 
provided by the statements of witnesses. However, before
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excluding casualties occurring in conditions of good visi­
bility, such cases should be carefully studied. As it has 
been said before, the simulator is always working under 
the principle of establishing continuous position of the 
vessels as a response to speed, course and environmental 
influences inputs. Therefore, this feature of radar simu­
lators can be used with great advantages to obtain a gra­
phic reconstruction from a digital plotter, even if the 
radar picture is left out.
An aspect to be considered is the type of radar 
installed on board the vessels involved in the collision 
and the presentation which has been in use. This question 
will be analysed when establishing the radar simulator 
requirements.
Furthermore, as it has been previously considered, 
radar simulators are able to provide a good response of 
ship acceleration, deceleration and turning in deep 
waters, while simulation of the behaviour of the vessel in 
shallow and restricted waters is limited to a few very 
advanced simulators. Even being such the case, there are 
situations in which it is hardly possible to simulate the 
behaviour of a particular ship involved in a collision, to 
provide a valid result. Consequently, those cases shall be 
excluded from the analysis.
4.2.3 Number of ships involved
It seldom occurs that more than two vessels partici-
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pate directly in the accident, .though other ships may 
contribute indirectly. As the vessels colliding will be 
represented by the radar simulator "own" ships, the cases 
which will be considered are those in which two vessels 
have actually collided, while other ships in the vicinity 
may have had a passive role. However,those ships will 
still be taken into consideration during the reconstruc­
tion.
4.3 Minimum radar simulator specifications
A radar simulator that will be used to investigate a case 
of collision at sea should satisfy a certain number of requi­
sites in order to provide valuable information regarding the 
most probable course of events. The main characteristics and 
features of radar simulators have been analysed in chapter 3. 
Now, specific requirements will be established taking into 
account the type of marine occurrences to be reconstructed.
4.3.1 "Own" ships
It is required that the radar simulator be equipped 
with at least two "own" ships, each of which will repre­
sent one of the vessels involved in the collision. The 
ships must be fitted with a radar set, engine control and 
rudder control.
If standard radars have been used on the bridges of 
the ships involved, it is convenient to know the kind of 
presentation in use and the simulator set should be able
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to be switched to that mode. In recent years there has 
been a large increase in the use of ARPA radars and due 
to international requirements, it can be expected that 
the number of ships equipped with those radars will con­
tinue to increase. As a consequence it can also be expec­
ted that the number of collisions occurring while an ARPA 
radar was in operation will be larger. Although ARPA 
radars must fulfil a number of minimum requirements to be 
considered as such, different manufacturers have chosen a 
variety of presentations to solve the problem of colli­
sion avoidance. It is not likely to occur that a radar 
simulator is provided with an ARPA radar of the same 
manufacture as the one on board a ship which has collided 
and less if both ships have been using ARPA radars of 
different manufacture. As a matter of fact, certain simu­
lators have been equipped with ARPA radars which do not 
respond to any standard set in the market. Even if the 
simulator is equipped with the same ARPA sets as the ones 
installed on board the ships involved in the casualty, 
the information which may have been collected on board 
from the ARPA can not be reproduced in the simulator due 
to the number of factors which influence the processing 
of data. Therefore, the information concerning ARPA data 
has to be considered as additional, and the case replayed 
using the standard radar.
The dynamic behaviour of the "own" ships must res­
pond to mathematical models which can be adapted to simu­
late the manoeuvring characteristics known of the actual 
vessels which have participated in the casualty.
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4.3.2 Targets
In addition to the "own" ships, in certain cases 
other vessels play a passive role in the collision and 
those ships must be included in the reconstruction of the 
case. For that purpose it is necessary to use targets, 
that is radar echoes representing ships which are under 
control of the instructor. It is not required that these 
targets be provided with a complete mathematic model as 
their manoeuvre can be controlled from the instructor's 
console and on the other hand, the ships they represent 
are only indirectly involved in the collision. It is dif­
ficult to establish beforehand the maximum number of 
ships which will be in that situation before knowing the 
case, and therefore it can only be stated that the radar 
simulator should be provided with as many targets as sig­
nificant traffic was present at the time of the colli­
sion. Normally, four targets for this purpose should be 
sufficient to represent the picture of the traffic sur­
rounding the ships which participated in the collision, 
and having influence in the accident.
4.3.3 Coastline
The number of coastlines available in the library of 
radar simulators is fixed and limited. More than often 
the area in which the collision occurred is not included. 
However, as the type of accidents to be investigated are 
collisions at sea, the influence of the coastline in the 
analysis of the case is limited. If it is required to
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have certain fixed reference marks such as light-vessels, 
light-houses or others, it is always possible to repre­
sent them with targets in a fixed position. In such 
cases, in addition to the targets required to include 
traffic, extra targets shall be needed as reference marks 
according to the circumstances.
4.3.4 Instructor's console facilities
4.3.4.1 "Own" ships characteristics
The radar simulator should be provided with 
the facility to modify the coefficients of the 
mathematical models of the "own" ships in order 
to adapt them to the real vessels, and this pro­
cess should be independent for each of them. As 
a result of the instructions, acceleration, 
deceleration and turning rate must respond to 
the behaviour expected of the ships involved in 
the collision. The cases to be analysed have 
been limited to collisions in deep waters in 
order to avoid situations in which a radar simu­
lator might not be able to respond to trte real 
behaviour of the vessels under other circumstan­
ces. Shallow water situations are limited to 
a few advanced radar simulators.
4.3.4.2 Target control
Those vessels that represent the traffic in
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the area of the collision, except the two vessels 
actually colliding, are under control of the 
instructor and therefore it must be possible to 
alter course and speed at any time from the con­
sole according to the situation.
4.3.4.3 Playing areas
A basic requirement is that the geographical 
location of the ocurrence must be reproduced in 
the simulator, even if the coastline is not 
represented . Normally this is not a restriction 
as most radar simulators cover any geographical 
area of the world, and if not, at least the areas 
commonly used for navigation are included. If the 
longitude is not covered, it may be replaced by a 
longitude within the limits of the simulator 
without introducing any change in the final 
results.
4.3.4.4 Environmental influences
In the analysis of the marine casualties 
under study, a number of external factors may be 
present. Those are wind, current and precipita­
tion. The effect of wind will result in a certain 
drift of the ships and sea clutter on the radar 
screen. Advanced radar simulators include the 
effect of wind drift, but as such is not the case 
in many radar simulators, the instructor must
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normally calculate this effect and introduce wind 
drift manually. Sea clutter must be electronical­
ly generated by the software and it is desirable 
that its intensity can be graduated. Current is 
an environmental factor which has to be program­
med by the instructor. Normally both vessels 
involved in the collision will be influenced by 
the same current. However, if the case is 
reconstructed starting a considerable time before 
the accident, the efect might be different and 
therefore the possibility of programming indepen­
dent currents for each ship is not a requirement 
but will simplify the work of the operator in 
those cases. Precipitation may have an influence 
on the picture seen on the radar screen, and in 
certain cases it can be an important factor in 
the detection of echoes. Most radar simulators do 
not provide simulation of rain clutter and if 
they do, the result is generally not realistic. 
On the other hand, it is very improbable that 
good information about rain or showers is known 
after the collision occurred. Therefore a situa­
tion of heavy rain or showers may pose a restric­
tion to the analysis of a case using simulation.
4.3.A.5 Radar response
In addition to the sea clutter mentioned 
before, the instructor should be able to program 
radar antenna height and echo strength according
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to the characteristics of the ships involved, 
which will affect the detection of echoes.
4.3.4.6 Cinematic information
In order to monitor the development of the 
situation, during the analysis of the case the 
console should provide information about posi­
tion, course, speed, CPA and TCPA of all vessels 
concerned. It is desirable that the position of 
any vessel be expressed as bearing and distance 
from both ships involved in the collision.
4.3.4.7 "Freezing"
This term means the possibility of detention 
of an exercise without modification in the final 
results, in order to study the situation at any 
particular time and it is an important feature 
both during the testing of a case and its 
demonstration.
4.3.5 Recording devices
4.3.5.1 Graphic plotter
This device, which can be considered as the 
graphical track recorder, is a fundamental tool 
to plot the positions of the vessels and follow 
the development of the collision situation. The
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graphic or graphics that will be obtained replace 
the manual plotting of the case.The number of 
ships that can normally be plotted in a graphic 
plotter is limited but not less than 8 vessels 
can be handled by such devices, which is more 
than enough for the purpose of collision investi­
gation. It is advisable to have different scales 
in order to enlarge the area around the point of 
collision and clarify the situation during the 
last minutes before the occurrence. A plot of the 
position of the ships every minute, which is a 
standard interval, provides a good information 
about the development of the events.
4.3.5.2 Electronic recorders
A number of radar simulators include elec­
tronic devices such as magnetic tape recorders, 
floppy disks and video recorders aimed at recor­
ding the exercises done and replaying the situa­
tion during the subsequent debriefing. For the 
purpose of casualty investigation such recorders 
are not a must but rather a complement to the 
graphics obtained from the graphic plotter and 
therefore if they are included in the simulator 
they should be used to show a complete picture of
the case.
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4.3.5.3 Printers
A print out of the cinematic information 
mentioned before at crucial times will replace 
the manual recording of that data and therefore, 
although the printer does not form part of the 
minimum requirements it should be used if the 
radar simulator has such facility.
4.4 Conclusion
The use of radar simulators in casualty investigations is 
not presented as a new method of reconstructing collisions at 
sea but rather as an improved alternative to the manual plot­
ting. The type of collisions has been restricted to the cases 
in which a radar simulator complying with the minimum speci­
fications established before in this chapter can provide a 
faster and more accurate solution. Once it has been established 
that a case can be subject to investigation in the radar simu­
lator, taking into consideration the limitationspresented in 
this chapter, the operator of the simulator will be faced with 
the task of finding a solution to the problem which is seldom 
easily reached. In the next chapter guidelines are given which 
should help the operator to carry out the investigation work.
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CHAPTER 5
THE TASK FOR THE OPERATOR OF THE SIMULATOR
5.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the practical work which has to be 
carried out by the operator of the simulator in order to 
reconstruct a casualty and establish the most probable chain of 
events. Normally this job should fall in the hands of the radar 
simulator teacher or instructor, who will be referred to as the 
operator, and who has both the nautical experience and the 
knowledge and practical skills in handling the simulator requi­
red to do the reconstruction work.
It can be expected that not two casualties are alike and 
therefore no strict rules can be applied. However, it should be 
possible to establish basic procedures and gidelines to help to 
tackle any collision problem, and an attempt in that direction 
is made here.
5.2 Sources of information
To start to deal with a collision case, it is necessary to 
collect all the information available about the casualty, which 
includes witnesses statements and evidence, obtained by the
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investigator or the investigating team. The way by which the 
information will be made available to the operator and its 
amount depends upon his position in the investigation process. 
The operator might be a member or an assessor of the investi­
gating body, or be approached by the plaintiffs' and/or defen­
dants' solicitors. In any case, it does often happen that the 
information is scarce or partial, specially as far as facts are 
concerned, which will make the analysis of the accident diffi­
cult. Once all documentation is in the hands of the operator, 
it should be carefully studied in order to establish whether 
the reconstruction can be attempted or additional information 
is required. However, there is always a limit in the data avai­
lable and the question is whether the reconstruction of certain 
cases be abandoned because of this limitation. As the result of 
a reconstruction represents a probability rather than a cer­
tainty, the tests might be carried out in all cases and the 
final results graded in accordance to the degree of confidence. 
On certain occasions it may happen that no information at all 
can be obtained from one of the parties to the casualty, either 
because it is not disclosed or the ship and the crew have been 
lost, in which case the reconstruction can only be carried out 
based on the data provided by the other party and/or external 
sources. Those external sources of information should always be 
consulted, including if applicable:
(a) weather reports
(b) current data
(c) tidal information
(d) notices to mariners
(e) records of shore communication stations
(f) reports of vessels in the vicinity
(g) ship's data documentation
5.3 Initial reconstruction
As a starting point, the first reconstruction should repo- 
duce the tracks followed by each of the ships based on the wit­
nesses statements together with the evidence produced, regard­
less of the claims or the information provided by the counter­
parts. In an ideal situation, this test should be based on 
positions obtained on both ships, manoeuvres carried out with 
time of execution, and data about the ships and their beha­
viour. However, a problem which can be expected is that comp­
lete information about the characteristics of the vessels is 
not available. As it has been established in Chapter 4, the 
simulator should be able to reproduce the manoeuvring characte­
ristics of the vessels involved in the collision, which does 
not imply that it will always be possible to feed the simulator 
with accurate data. As a matter of fact, more than often no 
information at all can be obtained, which means that in order 
to continue the reconstruction the operator will have to produ­
ce his own figures, based on data about ships similar to the 
vessels involved in the collision and/or his own experience. It 
should also be taken into consideration that even if complete 
information is available, the accuracy of the information pro­
vided can be seriously questioned when it comes to establish 
values such as the amount of rudder angle or the response of 
the engine without data recorders. On the other hand, in many 
cases there is a discrepancy between manoeuvring data obtained 
during trials and the actual behaviour in a specific situation.
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If, as a result of the reconstruction, both ships arrive at the 
same time in the same position, which is the collision point, 
the problem has been solved and the plot obtained from the 
graphic plotter together with the report prepared by the ope­
rator and an electronic recording, if available, will constitu­
te the documentation provided by the test on the radar simula­
tor. In many cases, however, it will be found that a controver­
sy appears in the result of the analysis and no collision 
occurs, which means that no straightforward solution exists. 
Nevertheless, this initial reconstruction should always be inc­
luded in the report before any alternative solution because the 
statements of the witnesses must be taken into account in a 
first attempt to establish the course of events, even if it is 
obvious that it will not lead to a collision. In fact, this 
test will be the proof that alternatives have to be looked for.
5.4 Additional tests
It is clear that when ambiguities appear, the most diffi­
cult task starts for the operator. He must look for alternative 
solutions until he finds the most probable chain of events 
which lead to the collision, now considering not only the sta­
tements of the witnesses but also all the data. The most impor­
tant factors to be analysed are considered.
5.4.1 Position of collision
Hopefully, the position of the collision will be 
agreed upon by the parties, but in many cases both will 
report different positions. If no evidence can be gathe­
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red (such as position.of wreck or information from other 
sources) then both positions should be plotted during the 
reconstruction so as to assess which one is more reliab­
le, although both may be erroneous. Prevailing currents 
and wind in the area may help the operator to overcome 
the ambiguity. The positioning methods utilized by the 
officers on watch should also be analysed to eliminate 
positioning errors.
5.4.2 Time of collision
There may appear discrepancies in the times of col­
lision reported by the parties. The difference can be 
attributed either to lack of synchronization between the 
clocks on both bridges or misjudgement of time data. If 
no evidence is available to solve the ambiguity, the 
tests in the simulator will have to be made considering 
the information provided by both ships and the most pro­
bable time will be the result of the analysis in the 
simulator.
5.4.3 Ships' positions
If the tracks followed by the ships, or the posi­
tions at sufficiently short intervals are known, they 
constitute very valuable information prior to the acci­
dent. Due to the lack of systematic data recording 
systems on board ships, the best evidence available is 
the navigational chart or the log book, provided that the 
positions have been transferred to that book. Such infer-
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mation can enable the operator to establish most probable 
true courses and speeds, together with effects of wind 
and/or current. Again, as has been considered before, 
errors in the position fixing methods must be taken into 
consideration.
5.4.A Manoeuvres
In the absence of evidence, the task of establishing 
the manoeuvres carried out by the ships involved will 
consist in a series of trials making use of the most 
reliable information and taking into account the degree 
of confidence which can be attributed on the veracity of 
the statements. As a result of this analysis, modifi­
cations in the original versions must be introduced until 
the ships actually collide. • The corrections introduced 
should, however, be based on logical assumptions which 
can be justified in the context of the real general 
situation.
Course recorders, if operating properly, supply 
extremely important information about course alterations, 
so that the .operator should always try to collect and 
include that piece of evidence.
5.4.5 Angle of impact
This is another piece of information to establish 
the manoeuvres made before the collision. An approximate 
collision angle is in most cases remembered by the wit­
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nesses although it may also raise controversy. If a sur­
veyor has access to both ships involved in the accident, 
an examination of the damages suffered by the vessels can 
usually provide a good approximation of the angle of 
impact, either to corroborate the witnesses' statements 
or to establish its value.
5.5 Documentation
Bearing-in mind the purpose of the reconstruction, that is 
to establish the most probable cause of the collision, and con­
sidering that the final conclusions do not represent with abso­
lute certainty the real course of events but rather what is 
believed to have happened based on the information gathered, 
the operator of the simulator should prepare all the documenta­
tion required to support the conclusions.
It was mentioned before that the bases of the report are 
the plots obtained from the graphic plotter. These include the 
original version and all the alternatives analysed until a 
final conclusion is arrived at. When necessary, and especially 
in the final reconstruction, it is advisable to make expanded 
graphs with shorter plotting intervals if this facility is inc­
luded in the radar simulator, to show in more detail the last 
events before the collision. Each graph must be accompanied by 
the pertinent information about its content and meaning. In 
radar simulators equipped with electronic recording devices, 
the different reconstructions should also be recorded by that 
means, which will enable the demonstration "in situ", with the 
advantage of the availability of radar pictures of the situa­
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tion. Even if no electronic recording can be made, it is always 
possible to show the situation on both bridges simply by rep­
laying the case in the simulator. Careful analysis of the 
events can be done "freezing" the test at any moment. Those 
radar pictures can be compared with the radar information 
remembered by the parties, although it can be expected that 
very seldom witnesses will actually participate in the recons­
truction during the investigation process.
Finally, evidence such as navigational charts, course 
recorders, position recorders, log books, engine data recorders 
and whichever else is available and pertinent should form part 
of the documentation to support the conclusions of the opera­
tor.
5.6 Conclusion
The task of reconstructing a collision at sea represents a 
challenge for the operator of a radar simulator as one can be 
almost certain that ambiguities and discrepancies will occur, 
and the information available will be scarce.
It is important to remember that the purpose is to estab­
lish the probable course of events, as the key to ascertain 
causes and propose measures for avoidance of similar casualties 
to happen in the future, in the context of safety at sea. The­
refore, no efforts should be spared to try to obtain results 
compatible with reality, but on the other hand, an infallible 
conclusion should not be expected due to the number of variab­
les involved and which can not always be completely known. In
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this context, the installation of data recorders, including 
radar video recording, on board ships should be given conside­
ration and an analysis of the subject is done in chapter 7.
A number of cases of collisions at sea have been recons­
tructed using radar simulators and in the next chapter, four 
cases have been selected as examples of typical situations and 
the subsequent analysis made.
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. CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF CASES
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, four cases of collision at sea based on 
real occurrences are analysed with the aid of a radar simulator 
and the results are presented. The simulator used meets the 
minimum requirements stated in chapter 4, and includes four 
"own" ships. In addition to a digital plotter, a floppy disk 
unit for electronic recording is fitted. Therefore, although 
only graphic results have been included in this analysis, a 
full picture of the situation can be stored for replay of each 
case at any time. The graphs drawn by the digital plotter 
reproduce the situations in a Mercator projection.
As can be expected, the information gathered in each of 
the cases is very voluminous. Therefore only the most relevant 
part of it has been included here and a summarized analysis of 
the collisions has been done. Neither blame nor apportionment
of fault have been considered.
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6.2 Case 1
This is a case of collision in dense fog between a loaded 
cargo vessel of 800 TDW, 55 metres in length and full speed 
about 9 knots, referred to as X and a vessel in ballast of 320 
TDW, length 40 metres, full speed about 8 knots, referred to as 
Y. The collision occurred at 0310 in position 56 28.5 N and 
16 16.0 E, obtained from a Decca fix. As a result of the colli­
sion, ship X capsized and sunk, and all documentation was lost.
A reconstruction of the events as recalled by the witnes­
ses on ship X resulted in the following summary:
At about 0215 of the day of collision the ship passed clo­
se to Tradgardsgrund lightbuoy (56 37.6 N, 16 21.7 E) with
reduced speed due to bad visibility on a course 196 true. At 
0240 an echo was detected on the radar screen at about 12 miles 
fine on the port bow and approaching the heading marker. Three 
successive alterations of course of 5 degrees to starboard whe­
re carried out when the range to the target was about 5.5 
miles, 4 miles and 2.5 miles. It was observed that the echo 
always continued to approach the heading marker. A new course 
alteration of 10 degrees to starboard was ordered, no time 
registered and with the echo very close, no range measurement 
possible. By reducing pitch the speed was reduced to slow 
ahead. After 2 or 3 minutes a white light and later a green 
light was observed about 45 degrees to port, very close. 
Hard-astarboard and dead slow ahead was ordered. At 0310 the 
collision occurred. Visibility was estimated in 100 metres. 
During the events both captain and mate where on the bridge and
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the auto-pilot was in use.
It was claimed that the collision occurred because the 
echo altered course to port. No radar plotting was made.
Vessel Y presented chart and log-book at the investiga­
tion. The narrative based on documents and memory is as fol­
lows:
At 0220 of the day of the collision the ship passed 
Utgrunden light house (56 22.6 N, 16 15.7 E), range about 1 
mile on course 010 true. The echo of a vessel was first obser­
ved on the radar screen at about 7 miles, 5 degrees to star­
board. When the vessels approached, the speed was reduced to 
half and later to dead slow by reducing the pitch. The echo 
disappeared in the sea clutter. The white and red lights of a 
ship were observed at about 50 metres away and the collision 
occurred. The ship had been steered on auto-pilot and both cap­
tain and mate were on the bridge. It was claimed that according 
to the observations of the echo, a safe CPA resulted and there­
fore no alteration of course was decided. No radar plotting was 
carried out.
In order to take into account the versions of the witnes­
ses, a first test should be made based on that information, 
which in this case was omitted because at reduced speed ship X 
could not arrive in time to the collision position. This is 
clearly shown in the first reconstruction made here. The 
reconstruction started with a plotting of the tracks of both 
ships, assuming full speed and no change of course. From an
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analysis made of the earlier navigation of the vessels, a mean 
speed of 9.5 knots for X and 8.5 knots for Y. The results are 
shown in figure 6.1.1 (page 94), in which the targets represent 
the following:
01 : ship X
02 : ship Y
10 : Utgrunden light-house
12 : buoy three cables westwards of wrecked ship
13 : position of collision
14, 15, 16 : fixed targets positioned in same longitude and 1 
minute of latitude apart to be used as distance 
scale
The plotting interval is 2 minutes, and starts at 0220 
when ship Y passed Utgrunden lighthouse. The position of X at 
that time corresponds to the DR five minutes after passing 
Tradgardsgrund lightbuoy. The plotting is stopped at 0302 and 
shows that even at full speed, ship X could not reach the col­
lision position at 0310. It also shows that without any course 
alteration ship Y headed towards that position but a reduction 
of speed should be considered in order to reach that point at 
0310. From this reconstruction it can also be concluded that at 
0240 ship X could not have detected the echo of Y at 12 miles.
A second attempt was made, modifying the position of vesel X at 
0220 so that Tradgardsgrund lightbuoy was abeam at 0205, ten 
minutes earlier than stated, and which would allow the vessel 
to reach the collision point at 0310. Furthermore, when the 
distance between ships was 5.5 miles, 4 miles and 2.5 miles, 
the course of ship X was altered 5 degrees to starboard at a
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rate of 60 degrees per minute. These events occurred at 0245, 
0250 and 0255. A new alteration of 10 degrees to starboard was 
done at the assumed time of 0259, when the ships were 1.4 miles 
apart. The result of this reconstruction is figure 6.1.2 (page 
95). It shows that the collision still does not occur as ship X 
will clear point 13 on her port side with a CPA close to one 
mile.
Still considering the course changes stated by ship X, 
which is probably more reliable than the distance obtained from 
the echo at the time of those changes, and assuming that a 
reduction of speed occurred only very close to the collision, 
several attempts were carried out in the simulator. The 
reconstruction of the most probable chain of events has been 
summarized in table I, with course and speed orders, and the 
corresponding plotting is shown in figure 6.1.3 (page 96).
Table 1
time ship X ship Y distance
course speed course speed
0252 201 9.5 010 8.0 3.5
0257 206 9.5 010 8.0 2.5
0258 206 9.5 010 5.0
0302 206 9.5 010 3.0
0303 211 9.5 010 3.0 0.6
0304 221 3.0 010 3.0 0.4
0306 hard-a-st. 3.0 010 3.0 0.15
0309 collision
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It is noted that the speed of ship Y has been reduced to 8 
knots so as to reach point 13 at the time of collision which in 
the reconstruction happened at 0309. The speed reductions of 
both vessels have also been estimated, as no reliable informa­
tion was available. The speed of ship X had to be considered 
full ahead until 5 minutes before the collision in order to 
arrive to that position at 0309. The angle of impact amounted 
to 80 degrees. Figure 6.1.4 (page 97) is the same final 
reconstruction but using a larger scale. Therefore, it starts 
at 0250 and the plotting interval is one minute.
6.3 Case 2
This accident was a collison in very low visibility bet­
ween a fully loaded tanker (referred to as X) of 1200 TDW and a 
length of 75 metres, and a fully loaded cargo vessel of 2100 
TDW and a length of 85 metres (referred to as Y). The collision 
■ occurred in position 55 28.0 N, 14 38.5 E at 2245. No wind or 
currrent was reported. The impact was at approximate right ang­
les and the vessels suffered minor damages.The statements 
obtained from both vessels were as follows:
Vessel X:
The ship was proceeding on course 058 at a speed of 10.5 
knots. An echo was observed on the radar screen at about 2220, 
5 degrees to starboard (radar on relative motion and head up) 
and at a distance of 8 miles. A plotting was initiated on a 
plotting sheet. Six minutes later the same echo was plotted 
again together with another one about 130 degrees to starboard, 
distance 1.8 miles. A third echo was also plotted on the hea­
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ding marker. The master and the mate on watch discussed the 
possibility of turning to starboard to avoid both vessels ahead 
but the master decided to maintain course so as to keep a safe 
distance to the high speed vessel on parallel course on her 
starboard side, which was overtaking. Course and speed were 
maintained until the distance to the echo approaching fine on 
the starboard side was about 1.5 miles, when the speed was 
reduced to 5 knots. Later, a new speed reduction to about 2 to 
3 knots was made but just before the collision. When the colli­
sion occurred, the ship was seen turning hard to starboard. 
Ship X did not make any attempt to alter course until just 
before the collision. The ship was being steered by auto-pilot.
Vessel Y:
The ship was on course 238 degrees, at a speed of about 
10.5 knots. On the bridge was the master and a deck boy. The 
autopilot was in use. The radar was in operation and working on 
the 5 miles range scale, relative motion and head up. At about 
2230 a target was observed approximately 5 miles ahead and 1.3 
miles to port. When the echo was just within 4 miles, the 
master concluded that it was approaching on a constant bearing 
and that there was a risk of collision. He went to the autopi­
lot and changed course to 280 degrees. When the ship was on her 
new course the echo appeared about 50 degrees to port. The 
speed was reduced to 5 knots. An observation of the movement of 
the target showed that it was now approaching on constant bea­
ring. The master changed to manual steering, put the rudder 
hard-a-starboard and reduced speed to dead slow. However, the 
echo continued to approach. Ship Y reversed to full astern but 
at 2245 the collision occurred. The master claimed that the
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accident happened due to vessel X turning to port, which des­
troyed his avoiding manoeuvre to starboard.
The plotting carried carried out by vessel X has been 
reproduced with comments in figure 6.2.1 (page 98). In this 
collision case, a narrative was also obtained from a ship (re­
ferred to as Z), which before the collision was 2.0 to 2.5 
miles on the starboard quarter of vessel Y. This narrative is 
as follows:
Vessel Z:
The ship, a general cargo vessel of 2100 TDW, length 90 
metres, was on course 238 degrees and sailing at a speed of 
about 11 knots. She was slowly overtaking vessel Y. On the 
bridge was the master and a seaman whom the master was training 
in radar observation and plotting.The radar was in relative 
motion, head up and gyro synchronized. At about 2220, when ves­
sel Y was bearing 190 degrees and at a distance of about 10 
miles, another echo was plotted about 10 miles away, which see­
med to pass on a reciprocal course approximately 2.5 miles on 
the port side. Both the master and the seaman plotted the echo 
until it approached to 6 miles. Then the range scale was chang­
ed to 6 miles and a new plotting was started. The master noti­
ced that the echo now proceeded on a steady course right into a 
collision with vessel Y. It had been observed that ship Y had 
changed course and reduced speed because the echo was closer to 
the heading marker and nearer. The speed was reduced and an 
attempt was made to call the attention of vessel Y and warn her 
about the dangerous situation. At 2245 the collision occurred.
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The reconstruction work started with a plotting of the
situation according to the narratives of vessels X,Y and Z. The 
results are reproduced in figure 6.2.2 (page 99). The targets 
marked represent:
01 : vessel X
02 : vessel Y, from vessel X plotting
03 : vessel Z, from position of Y and her plotting from Z
10 : collision position
11 : high speed vessel plotted by X, overtaking on her port
side
12 : vessel Z, from vessel X plotting
13 : vessel X, according to statement by vessel Y
14 : vessel X, according to first plot made by vessel Z
20, 22 : fixed targets one mile apart, for scaling purposes
The reconstruction started at 2220 and was stopped at 
2245. The plotting interval selected was 2 minutes. Target 13 
was positioned in such way that at 2230 it could be detected by 
vessel Y about 5 miles ahead and 1.3 miles to port, and on a 
collision course. At 2233 the echo should be at 4 miles and 
therefore the course of Y was altered to 280 degrees, at a rate 
of 50 degrees per minute. At the estimated time of 2235, the 
speed of ship Y was reduced to 5 knots. As for ship X (target 
01), her speed was reduced to 5 knots at 2240 and to 3 knots at 
2244 being both times estimated as no accurate information was 
given. The graph shows that the distance between ship Y and 
target 13 at 2245 was 1.25 miles, and from ship Y to the colli­
sion point 0.85 miles. Therefore, it is probable that the 
manoeuvres carried out where started later than estimated. It
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is also noted that at 2230, targets 11, 13 and 14 are within 
0.6 miles of each other, and remembering what they represent, 
it suggests that the three targets were in fact only one echo, 
that is the fast ship overtaking vessel X. As stated by Y, the 
echo approached from 5 miles to 4 miles when it was assessed 
that there was a collision situation. From the plotting made by 
vessel X, the estimated speed of the fast ship ‘was 20 knots 
which means that at the combined speed of 30.5 knots the time 
taken to cover a distance of 1 mile was 2 minutes. A cross 
track error in plotting of 0.15 miles is enough in this case to 
give an impression of risk of collision for a target in opposi­
te course.
A new reconstruction of the accident was carried out, 
starting at 2235 and estimating 2238 as the time of vessel Y 
changing course to 280 degrees and 2239 the time of reduction 
of speed. The plotting interval was 2 minutes and the digital 
plotter was stopped at 2245.The result is shown in figure
6.2.3 (page 100). At the time of collision the distance between 
X and Y was still 0.45 miles. Therefore new attempts have to be 
made introducing corrections in the manoeuvres carried out. 
Figure 6.2.4 (page 101) is the reproduction of one of the 
tests, starting at 2235 and plotting every two minutes, in a 
new scale. The manoeuvres assumed for vessel X and vessel Y are 
summarized in table 2.
These assumptions produced a final situation in which both 
vessels were 0.25 miles apart at the time of collision, which 
according to the graph shows that still some adjustments in the 
manoeuvres carried out by ship Y are required in order to bring
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that distance to zero. The course alterations of vessel Y end 
up in a right angle situation with respect to vessel X at 2245.
table 2
time vessel X (target 01) vessel Y (target 02)
course ord. speed ord. course ord. speed ord.
2240 058 5.0 280 10.5
2241 058 5.0 310 5.0
2242 058 3.0 310 5.0
2244 058 3.0 330 2.0
6.4 Case 3
Case of collision between a tanker (referred to as X) of 
22600 CRT, 205 metres in length and powered by a diesel engine 
with single screw, and a general cargo vessel (referred to as 
Y) of about 15660 CRT, 185 metres in length also powered by a 
diesel engine with a single screw.
According to vessel X, the collision occurred at about 
0217 hours in position 57 34.1 N, 9 28.2 E, this position 
having been obtained as a DR from the satellite navigator. 
According to vessel Y, the collision occurred at 0220 hours in 
position 57 35.0 N, 9 30.0 E. The following narrative was
obtained from vessel X:
Vessel X:
The vessel had in operation two radar sets, one of 3 cms.
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in relative motion and the other of 10 cms. in true motion. At 
midnight, the lights of a ship proceeding in the same direction 
were seen broad on the starboard bow at about 1 to 2 miles 
distance, and the echo of another vessel going the same way was 
detected. At about 0100 the stern light of the second ship were 
sighted. Shortly after 0118 it was necessary to alter course 
about 10 degrees to port, to pass that ship, which happened at 
about 0140 hours. Positions were obtained from observations 
using the 3 cms. radar and from satellite fixes. The last posi­
tion before the collision was obtained from the satellite 
receiver at 0150 and was marked on the sea chart. Shortly befo­
re about 0217 hours the vessel was on course about 240 true and 
sailing at a speed of approximately 14.5 knots. The wind was 
west southwesterly, force 3, weather fine with moderately good 
visibility and there was no tidal or other current particularly 
noted. In'these circumstances, shortly after overtaking another 
vessel on the starboard side, an echo was seen on the 10 cm. 
radar at about 12 miles fine on the starboard bow. After a 
short interval it was determined that the ship was on recipro­
cal course and would pass safely starboard to starboard. The 
echo was kept under observation and when it came to 6 miles 
distance the observation was continued on the 3 cm. radar set 
on head up mode and 6 miles range scale. When the echo closed 
to 2 miles a visual search started and two masthead lights 
together with a red side light were sighted. The ship was 
distant about one mile, bearing about 40 to 50 degrees on the 
starboard bow and heading 100 to 110 degrees, approximately. It 
was seen altering course to starboard. The engine was stopped 
and the helm put hard-a-port. Immediately thereafter the ves­
sels collided at an angle of about 80 degrees with the port
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side of the other ship striking the bow of vessel X.
As for vessel Y, it was much more difficult to obtain an 
account of the events, which was as follows:
Vessel Y:
At 0000 hours the position of the ship was 57 17.5 N and
08 35.4 E. The course was 058 and the speed 14.5 knots. At 0040
the visibility was reduced to 1 mile. At 0153 a Decca fix was
obtained, the position being 57 31.3 N, 09 15.0 E and the echo
of a ship was detected on the radar screen at about 12 miles 
and 5 degrees on the starboard bow. At 0155 the course was 
altered to 088 degrees, manoeuvring to three ships coming 
against the vessel at a distance of 7.5 miles. During the next 
three to four minutes when vessel X should have been some 25 
degrees on the port bow she was carefully observed but as she 
took no action, the course was altered to 100 degrees. At a 
very late stage, the wheel was put hard-a-starboard and at 0217 
ship X was seen at a distance of one mile on the port side, 
turning to the right. At 0220 the collision occurred.
In this collision case, a statement was also obtained from 
the ship which had been overtaken by X. That ship is referred 
to as Z and her account is as follows;
Vessel Z;
The ship is a single screw motor ship of 9350 CRT with an 
overall length of 153 metres and a breadth of 20.3 metres. 
During the night of the collision the weather was calm, with 
fog patches, and occasionally the visibility was as low as half 
a mile. A position was obtained at 0110 and the course was put
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to 237 degrees, speed about 12 knots. At about 0200 hours the 
vessel was overtaken on the port side by ship X, which passed 
unnecessarily close. The steering was changed to manual when X 
approached. At the same time, the echo of vessel Y, bearing 
approximately 250 degrees and distant 5 to 6 miles was detected 
on the radar screen. The radar in use was a situation display 
radar. The observation of this echo showed that her bearing was 
closing on the bow and the speed was reduced. Vessel X and ves­
sel Y were observed on the screen while they approached each 
other. When the distance was about 2 cables, a heavy alteration 
of course to starboard by vessel Y was observed. No alteration 
of course of X was detected until the collision occurred. At 
that time the vessel was at a distance of about 1 to 1.5 miles 
from the collision position.
As evidence, the navigation chart and track recorder of 
vessel X were obtained. The track recorder showed from 0049 to 
0217 a course of 240 degrees, except for an alteration to 227 
degrees between 0124 and 0143, at a turning rate of about 30 
degrees per minute. At 0217, a sudden and drastic course change 
to port was observed, at an initial rate of 360 degrees per 
minute decreasing until the course stabilized on 105 degrees.
A first reconstruction of the case is shown in figure 
6.3.1 (page 102). This reconstruction is based on the satellite 
position obtained by vessel X at 0150, which her chart showed 
to be 57 36.8 N , 09 37.8 E, and the Decca fix obtained by Y at 
0153. The targets on the plotting represent:
01 : vessel X
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02 : vessel Y
10 ; vessel Z
11 ; unknown vessel sailing parallel to X
12 : collision position reported by X
13 : collision position reported by Y
15, 16, 17 and 18 : fixed targets one mile apart for scaling
purposes
The plotting was started at 0150 assuming vessel Z abeam of X 
and 0.6 miles apart sailing on course 237 at 10 knots. The 
plotting interval selected was 2 minutes and the course altera­
tions for vessel Y were as shown in table 3.
table 3
time course
0155 088
0200 100
0212 160
(hard-a-starb.)
This test shows that at 0214 ship X passed at a distance 
of 0.25 miles of the collision point reported, while Y ended up 
at 0220 hours 5.^9 miles away from position 13 and 4.65 miles 
away from position 12.
A second test was made relying on the position given by X 
and shifting the position of vessel*Y so that at 0150 the echo 
of X should have been detected bearing 062 degrees at a distan-
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ce of 11.8 miles. The subsecuent manoeuvres as stated by Y 
still took the vessel to a position 3.5 miles apart from 12 and 
4.2 miles from 13. This plotting was started at 0150, with a 
plotting interval of 2 minutes and is shown in figure 6.3.2 
(page 103).
Additionally, a test was made considering the position 
stated by Y to be correct and therefore shifting the positions 
of the three echoes to maintain same bearing and distance of X 
from Y as before. The plotting started at 0150 with two minutes 
interval. The results have been reproduced in figure 6.3.3 
(page 104), which shows that the position of vessel*Y at 0220 
is more than five miles to the south of either collision point. 
Therefore, a fourth reconstruction was made, which would allow 
ship Y to collide with X within one mile of the collision posi­
tion 12. For these events to occur it was assumed that Y kept 
course and speed until 0213, when ship X was at a distance of 
about 1.5 miles on her starboard bow. At that time, a course 
alteration to starboard with a turning rate of 45 degrees per 
minute was carried out. This reconstruction was started at 0150 
and the plotting interval was 2 minutes. It has been reproduced 
in figure 6.3.4 (page 105). The collision occurred at 0218. An 
enlarged plotting, starting at 0212 and with a plotting inter­
val of 30 seconds is shown in figure 6.3.5 (page 106). Accor­
ding to this test, at 0218 ship Z was at a distance of 1.9 
miles from the collision point.
6.5 Case 4
The casualty was a collision between a cargo vessel of
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1240 TDW, length 60 m (referred to as X), and a trawler of 200 
TDW, with a length of 30 m (referred to as Y) which was follo­
wing another trawler (referred to as Z). The collision occurred 
at about 0305 in position 55 43.0 N, 15 15.0 E in calm weather 
and dense fog. The following narrative is based on the state­
ment given by vessel X.
Vessel X:
The day before the accident, Sandhammaren light house 
(55 23.0 N, 14 11.8 E) was passed at 2300 hours, at a distance 
of 2 miles, on course 057 degrees and speed 10 knots. The 
intention was to pass Utklippan light (55 57.2 N, 15 42.2 E) at 
a distance of 2 to 3 miles. Langagrund light buoy was passed 4 
miles to port, the visibility being 2 to 3 miles. At 0130 the 
visibility decreased to 0.2 miles. At about 0255 the officer on 
duty observed on the radar screen two small echoes 5 degrees to 
starboard, distant 1.5 miles. The bearing did not change down 
to 1 mile. The range scale was changed to 2.5 miles but the 
echoes did not appear. When searching the vessels visually, one 
was sighted about 1 cable distant and 20 to 25 degrees to star­
board showing a red light and turning to starboard. On board 
vessel X course was changed putting the auto-pilot hard-a-star- 
board, and the pitch was changed to zero. When the vessel was 
right ahead, a second ship was seen about 2 cables behind the 
first, showing a red light. The first ship passed 50 metres in 
front but the second could not be avoided and the collision 
occurred with an angle of impact of about 45 degrees. At the 
time of the collision the course was about 100 degrees and the 
speed 5 to 7 knots.
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The events as stated by trawlers Y and Z resulted in the follo­
wing narrative:
Ships Y and Z :
Vessel Y was behind Z on her starboard quarter, about 0.25 
miles away. At 0055 Utklippan light was abeam at a distance of 
6.2 miles. The course was 238, speed 10 knots, and the visibi­
lity nil. At about 0240 vessel Z observed an echo on the radar 
screen right ahead about 4 miles distance. When the distance 
was 3.2 miles the bearing remained unchanged. Z called Y on VHF 
and said that they had to turn to starboard. Course was changed 
to 270, 275 and 280 degrees, and when Y sighted the echo it was 
3 miles away. At first the avoiding manoeuvre seemed to give 
effect but later, as the distance decreased, it seemed as if 
the echo had turned to port against the trawlers. Vessel Z tur­
ned more to starboard, followed by Y. At about 0300 hours, Z 
observed the two white lights of X and realized that she would 
pass astern. The visibility was about 200 metres. Z called 
again vessel Y and warned her about the situation. When Y 
sighted a white light on the port side about 50 metres apart, 
she reduced speed and turned more to starboard but it was too 
late. The collision occurred when the trawler was sailing at 
about 4 to 5 knots. The course was not known, although it had 
been altered from 238 degrees to starboard three times.
As usual, the first reconstruction in the radar simulator 
was made according to the events as stated by the parties. From 
the positions, courses and speeds given, the reconstruction was 
as shown in figure 6.4.1 (page 107). The plotting started at 
0230, with one minute interval, and was stopped at 0305. The
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targets represent;
01 : vessel X
02 : vessel Z
03 : vessel Y
10 : position of collision
11, 12 and 13 : fixed targets one mile apart for scaling purpo­
ses.
It can be seen that the final position of vessel X at the 
time of the collision is about 0.6 miles northwest from the 
collision point reported, while vessel Y was at 0305 almost at 
the collision position. In the reconstruction, and following 
the statements of vessels Y and Z, the course alteration orders 
were assumed as shown in table 4. The course alterations were 
simulated at a turning rate of 60 degrees per minute.
The second reconstruction is represented by figure 6.4.2 
(page 108). In this test, the position of X (now target 14), 
was shifted 0.6 miles to starboard in order to reach the colli­
sion position. A late course alteration to starboard was simu­
lated at 30 degrees per minute. The plotting started at 0230 
and the interval selected was one minute. Target 15 was inclu­
ded as the unknown echo detected by vessel Z and which gave 
origin to the course alteration which made the trawlers meet 
ship X.
An enlarged plotting is shown in figure 6.4.3 (page 109), 
in which vessel Z has been excluded in order to clarify the
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situation. This plotting started at 0250, the plotting interval 
was one minute, and the collision took place at 0306, 1.7 cab­
les away from the reported position.
table A
time vessel Z vessel Y
0245 270
0247 275 270
0248 280
0249 275
0251 280
0255 295
0256 295
0305 330
6.6 Conclusion
The four casualties analysed are characterized by discre­
pancies in and/or lack of information and this is the case in 
a great number of investigations. A solution was tried to over­
come these problems considering particular assumptions for each
case. These analyses remain estimates as a result of the limi- 
\ted information available to the operator, who has to adjust 
certain parameters based on his own judgement to arrive at 
the best obtainable patern. Therefore, the solutions obtained, 
which form part of the report of the investigation, must be 
regarded as the most probable course of events.
In the next chapter, the possibility of automatic regis­
tration of data to solve the above mentioned problems is ana­
lysed.
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CHAPTER 7
DATA ACQUISITION AND RECORDING UNITS ON BOARD SHIPS
7.1 Introduction
The information which investigators are able to collect 
after a casualty occurred is in many cases insufficient and 
imprecise. The cases analysed in chapter 6 reflect this situa­
tion in the case of collisions at sea, and also show the kind 
of assumptions which have to be made by the operator of the 
simulator,' not only filling in the information gaps but also 
deviating from the original statements, in order to produce the 
collision. As a matter of fact, the use of radar simulators is
proposed as a valuable tool to investigate collision cases
especially when conflicts and controversies arise during the 
reconstruction, because of the possibility to present a comple­
te picture of the situation and introduce different modifica­
tions in a relatively short time. To facilitate the work,
investigators might be instructed to try and obtain more pre­
cise and quantified information, bearing in mind the type of 
information required for the purpose of the investigation. 
A question, however, which remains to be answered is the degree 
of confidence which can be placed on statements that are not 
backed up by clear evidence.
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7.2 Data recording
An obvious solution to overcome this problem is to comple­
ment witnesses statements with registered operational data, 
adequately protected against destruction. The registration of 
certain information is in fact done on board ships and ashore 
in different ways, either manually, automatically or semi-auto- 
matically. In this context one can easily list the following:
(a) manually: 
bridge log book 
navigation chart 
engine room log book
(b) automatically or semi-automatically: 
course recorder
engine order recorder
electronic position fixing recorder
echosounder graphs
VTS information recorder
radar video recorder
The situation, however, is rather chaotic as the recor­
dings mentioned in (a) are seldom completed when events actual­
ly take place, and those listed in (b) are neither fitted in 
all ships nor always used properly. On the other hand, nothing 
prevents those recorders and their contents from being des­
troyed, either accidentally or intentionally, forged, lost, or 
simply not disclosed, should a casualty happen.
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7.3 Automatic data acquisition and recording units
In view of the lack of standardization in this field and 
the need for accurate information, consideration should be 
given to the installation on board ships of automatic data 
acquisition and recording units to supply reliable and complete 
information about the course of events prior to a casualty. 
Such devices will be referred to with the abbreviate denomina­
tion of "data recorders" in this project from now on. As those 
units have only been tested experimentally on a limited basis, 
there is no practical experience available to demonstrate that 
their use will lead to an increased safety at sea. However, in 
the process of safety oriented casualty investigations a large 
amount of data which nowadays is missing or unreliable, could 
be supplied by those data recorders, which suggests the desi­
rability of their installation on board ships. In this context, 
the experience gained through many years of use of flight 
recorders and the large number of investigations carried out in 
aeroplane accidents with the help of those recorders should not 
be neglected.
In this project, the question of data recorders on board 
ships is analysed within the framework of casualty investi­
gations, that is after accidents have occurred. However, the 
installation of recording devices might also result in improved 
safety as a preventive measure, inducing officers to safer 
practices if they are aware of the automatic recording of their 
actions. The discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of 
the project.
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The possibility of installing data recorders on board 
ships leads to the next question, that is at which level 
the possibilities should be discussed and evaluated. It can be 
expected that seafarers and shipowners will object to the 
introduction of such devices because of the vast consequences 
in the marine industry. An irresponsible handling of the infor­
mation collected can be feared if no well established legisla­
tion is set out. Therefore, regardless of the studies carried 
out by different governments and classification societies, such 
an important matter should receive consideration in internatio­
nal forums. In this context, it can be mentioned that the prob­
lem is dealt with in IMO by the Sub-committee on Safety of 
Navigation.
Before introducing data recorders as- an international 
requirement, a number of aspects must be elucidated, which will 
be briefly analysed.
7.3.1 Technical feasibility
Nothing indicates that insoluble problems might 
preclude the development, production and installation of 
such devices on board. In fact, prototype data recorders 
are actually under test. However, the complexity of the 
recorders and their costs will depend on the type of data 
required. The lack of standardization of shipborne equip­
ment represents a disadvantage which has to be considered 
when interfacing the recording device with the different 
sources of data.
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7.3.2 Objectives
It is necessary to define which are the objectives 
for installing the recorders on board ships. From the 
definition, it is clear that the reason for having such 
devices is to provide a way to save operational data on 
board the ship. This information may then be used as a 
basis for analysis whenever that is thought to be nec­
essary. The question are, should the use of recorded data 
be restricted to certain occurrences, who should have 
access to the data, and should it also be used under nor­
mal operation of the ship. The objectives will influence 
the type and amount of data to be recorded and possib­
ly have legal consecuences as well.
7.3.3 Data to be registered
The information to be recorded may be limited to 
that necessary to establish the course of events prior to 
a collision or grounding, or may be extended to include a 
large number of parameters covering all aspects of the 
operation of the ship. This point is closely linked to 
the objectives mentioned in paragraph 7.3.2.
For the type of analysis which is dealt with in the 
context of this project, it is required to have data pro­
viding an adequate picture of the ship's movement and 
environmental situation prior to a collision. Bearing in 
mind, however, that the reconstruction should not only be 
made to establish the course of events but also to deter­
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mine cause relationship, additional information is requi­
red. The following data acquired and recorded could form 
in principle an adequate analysis basis :
- time
- position
- course
- speed
- engine orders
- main engine data
- radar video data
- speech recording
- ship's technical data
The voice recording listed refers to communications 
on the bridge related to the handling of the ship, that 
is orders and commands, and radio traffic.
7.3.4 Protection against damage and recovery
In the event of damage to the ship, the question of 
protection of the information contained in the data 
recorder must be considered. The data should also be pro­
tected against unauthorized manipulation. Not less impor­
tant is the recovery of the device if as a result of the 
casualty the ship sinks.
7.3.5 Recording duration
As any other recording device, the data recorder
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will* have a limited memory capacity. It is not conceivab­
le that all the data accumulated during a long sea passa- 
•ge can be recorded and therefore a minimum memory loop 
has to be specified in order to retrieve enough data to 
obtain valuable information within the established objec­
tives. The memory capacity is closely linked with the 
sampling rate of the recorder. A means to reset the 
system at the end of an uneventful journey or for other 
reasons has to be accounted for.
7.3.6 Testing and monitoring
A data recorder should include the possibility to 
test the operational status of the device as well as a 
way to monitor that valid data is being recorded, without 
disturbing the normal operation of the unit.
7.3.7 Scope of application
Should the use of data recorders become a require­
ment under international law, certainly certain ships 
will be exempted, as it happens with the regulations of 
almost all international legal instruments. Therefore, 
agreement has to be reached upon the applicable exemp­
tions and limitations.
7.3.8 Juridical aspects
As it was considered in paragraph 7.3.2, a careful 
analysis should be made of the legal aspects of using and
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operating the data recorders on board ships because the 
information obtained from those units will constitute 
material evidence. Privileges attached to this evidence 
and in what way it can be used in case of legal action 
• are to be clearly established and later included in the
legislation of each country.
7.4 Positioning systems
One of the key aspects of the installation of data recor­
ders on board ships as far as navigation monitoring is concer­
ned, is the availability of positioning data. So far, there is 
no system available which provides accurate and continuous 
position on a world wide basis, which in itself represents an 
important limitation. In this field, a number of global posi­
tioning systems are under development and will become operatio­
nal in the near future for use on board merchant ships. Those 
systems will provide all weather, world wide continuous posi­
tion with a minimum accuracy of 0.1 miles (R95) for commercial 
use. Therefore, it can be expected that if data recorders are 
to become mandatory for world wide use and the position of the 
ship is one of the parameters to be registered, they would only 
be introduced after those positioning systems are put into ser­
vice and used on board merchant ships.
7.5 Conclusion
There are strong arguments in favour of the use of data 
recorders on board ships within the framework of safety at sea. 
The rapid technological advancements in the marine field now
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makes the development of these recorders possible, which will 
probably become a familiar device in the not so far future. 
Their use will represent a major step in the solution of prob­
lems connected to the investigation of accidents to ships and 
determination of cause relationship. However, they represent an 
interference on board which will obviously be resisted, consi­
dering it as a threat to freedom of action and privacy. Also, 
the installation of such sophisticated devices on board will 
certainly involve extra expenditures for the shipowner.
Maritime administrators now have the opportunity to anti­
cipate the numerous problems which will arise and take steps at 
an early stage at international level to ensure the proper use 
of the recorders together with the information provided.
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CHAPTER 8 
LEGAL ASPECTS
8.1 Introduction
In this project, the reconstruction of collision cases at 
sea with the help of radar simulators has been analysed basi­
cally in the context of marine casualty investigation. There­
fore the reconstruction work will become an integral part of 
the investigation procedure conducted by a governmental agency, 
which has been dealt with in chapter 2. Certainly, a collision 
might also be subject to test in the simulator at request of 
the solicitor of one or both of the parties to the casualty. In 
any case, a reconstruction is one of the wheels in a mechanism 
which works under the umbrella of the legislation established 
by each country. Therefore, the operator of the simulator 
should be aware of the legal implications of the process.
8.2 Non-official settlement of disputes
In this case, the aim of the reconstruction work will be 
to strengthen the position of a party in a civil liability dis­
pute and/or penal action in court. As the purpose of the soli­
citor's work is to protect the interests of his client, it can 
be expected that being such the case, there will be a bias in
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favor of one of the parties. If the results are unfavourable to 
the party represented, the reconstruction will of course be 
stopped and not mentioned any more. If, on the other hand, the 
findings are favourable, the lawyer will try to utilize them as 
evidence. The person responsible for the reconstruction work 
will probably be subject to cross-examination by the represen­
tative of the opposing party, who will try to discredit the 
evidence presented. Therefore, any assumption made which can 
not be clarified or explained with the help of clear facts will 
be utilized as a means to destroy the credibility of the 
results obtained. This question is particularly important if 
the case is taken to court.
8.3 Official inquiries
The situation is generally of a different nature if the 
work in the simulator forms part of an inquiry carried out by 
the administration. The operator of the simulator may form part 
of the staff of the investigating authority, in which case he 
has a good understanding of the investigation process and its 
legal aspects. More than once, however, his services may be 
required only occasionally as a specialist both in navigational 
and radar simulation matters. Therefore, he might not be fami­
liarized with the general procedures. A thorough knowledge of 
the particular legislation and investigating practices and pro­
cedures in use will be of great benefit both for the operation 
of the simulator and for the success of the whole process. The­
re are several points of particular interest in this context 
which will be elaborated in the following below.
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8.3.1 The objective of the investigation
As analysed in chapter 2, the objectives of the 
investigation vary greatly from country to country and 
can be classified as follows:
(a) to determine cause relationship
(b) to recommend safety measures
(c) to establish fault and take disciplinary action
(d) to apportion liability
Regardless of the advantages or disadvantages of the 
system adopted, it must be known whether the investiga­
tion is solely oriented to determine causes and make 
appropriate recommendations or to determine blame and 
impose penalties, or a combination of both. Investigators 
must bear in mind that for the purpose of taking discip­
linary action, where the rights of individuals are invol­
ved, the evidences presented must meet standards far 
beyond those required to recommend safety measures. On 
the other hand, an impartial investigation purely orien­
ted to safety improvement may result in a report from 
which fault gives rise to disciplinary action and civil 
liability, even if these questions are dealt with by 
another court. This fact should not interfere with the 
investigation procedure.
8.3.2 Status and role of interested parties
In any casualty investigation a number of parties
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are involved for various reasons. Parties include not 
only the persons directly connected to the accident but 
also shipowners, underwriters and regulatory bodies, 
among others. Whether the different parties have a status 
participants, partial participants or observers, 
together with their role during the many stages of the 
investigation has to be established in the legislation. 
The operator of the simulator is particularly interested 
in the degree of participation of those parties during 
the tests as well as the documentation and reports which 
can be released. He must also know if the parties may be 
accompanied or represented by a councelor, and their role 
during witnesses' interviews.
8.3.3 Powers and jurisdiction of the investigating authority
In order to conduct the inquiry, designated officers 
must be given specific powers by way of appropriate 
legislation. Those powers refer to detention of ships 
and/or wrecks, inspection of premises, seizure of docu­
mentation and other evidence, test of equipment and exa­
mination of witnesses. Under certain legislations the 
testimonies of witnesses must be taken under oath and 
provisions about electronic recording of the interviews 
are also included.
8.3.4 Privilege attached to evidence obtained
The investigator must be aware of the confidentiali­
ty (or non confidentiality) of the evidence obtained.
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This point has been analysed in chapter 2 with respect to 
the possible advantages or disadvantages of the different 
ways in which this matter is treated under various legis­
lations. For the investigator it is important to know to 
what extent the evidences obtained can be used in subse­
quent legal proceedings. The same applies to any recor­
ding obtained either from a VT5, a coast radio station or 
the bridge of the ship. The use of names of ships and 
individuals involved in the accident together with any 
other means of identification when issuing the casualty 
report must also be considered in the context of the con­
fidentiality status.
8.4 Conclusion
The aforesaid aspects underline the basic legal matters to 
be taken into consideration, but do not exclude other specific 
regulations which might be found in a particular legislation. 
The operator of a radar simulator who may take part in an 
investigation process, either as a member or assesor of the 
inquiry board or as a private consultant, will inevitably be 
involved in the legal proceedings and therefore his understan­
ding of the problems is as important as his professional 
expertise in the field of the investigation.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this work has been to establish the possible 
contributions of radar simulators to the field of investigation of 
marine casualties, bearing in mind the objective of safety promo­
tion at sea. This has been done by analysing the suitability of the 
simulators for the reconstruction of collisions and groundings. In 
this context, it has been considered necessary to review both the 
marine casualty investigation process and the main characteristics 
of radar simulators before linking the two elements.
The first element, the investigation, has been recognized as a 
necessary procedure if the actual sequence of events prior to a 
casualty as well as the actions taken after the accident occurred 
are to be known, even when the results do not represent a guarantee 
of absolute certainty of the findings. Apart from that,the objec­
tives of the investigation have been classified, ranging from pure­
ly safety oriented objectives to those solely focused on establi­
shing blame. Certainly, both are extremes and generally the legis­
lation adopted by different countries will be based on objectives 
which are somewhere in between.
As a result of an accident, heavy losses will normally occur 
and this is especially the case in collissions at sea and groun­
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dings. Procedures aimed at establishing fault and apportioning lia­
bility will be conducted. Certain cases also require disciplinary 
action against individuals. However, the importance of analysing a 
case as the key to the proposal of safety measures has been stres­
sed. Whilst a penal action and/or the settlement of a dispute deal 
with a particular case after it has happened, adequate safety mea­
sures taken as a consequence of the investigation of an accident 
work as a preventive action which can avoid the occurrence of 
similar casualties in the future. The recommendation of measures is 
only the result of a study which starts by trying to establish the 
chain of events based on the information available.
The second element of this study, the radar simulator, has 
been subject to an analysis aimed at establishing its capabilities 
as well as its limitations. It is unfortunate that no internatio­
nally accepted rules exist to determine the minimum characteristics 
and specifications which a radar simulator must fulfil to be consi­
dered as such, particularly as it has been recommended elsewhere 
that courses should be conducted in that type of simulators, which 
are nowadays a common training tool in a great number of educatio­
nal institutes. However, by its own nature it was recognized that a 
radar simulator must reproduce ships' tracks as a result of their
response to engine and helm orders as well as to a number of envi-
«
ronmental influences, and in addition provide simulated radar pic­
tures of the situation to the radar displays installed on the brid­
ges.
Any simulator consists of a hardware and a built in programme 
to carry out the simulation, which may restrict the type of cases 
to be analysed. The minimum specifications of a radar simulator in
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order to be used to reconstruct a case of collision in deep waters 
have been considered.
It has been analysed that the need to reconstruct the path 
followed by a ship arises when a case of collision or grounding is 
under investigation, as a first step to determine the cause or cau­
ses of the accident. The better the course of events is ascertai­
ned, the more likely the cause or causes of the casualty can be 
established. Therefore, the aforesaid reconstruction is the link 
between the investigation process, in which such reconstruction is 
required and the radar simulator, which is the tool able to provide 
it.
It has been concluded that the use of the simulator does not 
represent any novel system to solve the problem, compared to the 
graphic methods of reconstruction by manual plotting on paper. It 
offers the opportunity to utilize an advanced electronic equipment 
which in addition to its capability of giving a continuous computa- 
rized dead reckoning position of the ships has the advantage of 
providing a radar picture of the situation as seen from the brid­
ges. This last feature is of special interest in those cases which 
involve a substantial use of the radar, when the information provi­
ded by witnesses can be tested in the simulator.
As has been considered, a number of limitations influencing 
the solution of the problem have to be taken into account. Those 
limitations have been divided into two categories, namely those 
arising from incomplete information about the events which led to 
the accident and the limitations of the radar simulator itself.
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Scarcity and unreliability of information is today a common 
problem which hampers the investigation process regardless of the 
reconstruction method selected and pleads for improved data collec­
tion systems on board ships, the best solution being automatic data 
'acquisition and recording units. It was recognized, however, that 
before those recorders become operational, if ever, an exhaustive 
analysis of the technical and juridical problems involved is requi­
red. It is also advisable that this matter be studied by interna­
tional bodies in order to achieve an optimum solution which satis­
fies all parties concerned. Most probably, a long period of study 
can be expected and in the mean time investigators will be obliged 
to continue the study of casualties basing their analysis on a com­
bination of facts and assumptions, unfortunately many times more on 
assumptions than on facts.
Should a collision or grounding case be put under test in the 
radar simulator, insufficient factual information will represent a 
limitation which has nothing to do with the characteristics of the 
simulator. Whilst most radar simulators meet the minimum specifi­
cations set out in this project, the wide disparity and degree of 
sophistication of existing simulators requires a preliminary ana­
lysis of collision cases in shallow or restricted waters as well as 
groundings before being put under test in the simulator. Such ana­
lysis together with the knowledge of the characteristics of the 
specific radar simulator which will be used to investigate the case 
will make it possible to assess the validity of the results and 
establish whether the complete case or only part of it can be 
reconstructed using simulation techniques.
The analysis of the two elements involved in this project.
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that is the investigation process and the radar simulator, does not 
complete the picture. A'fundamental factor which has also to be 
considered is the person responsible for the reconstruction work
using the simulator.
«
An efficient and effective use of radar simulators either as 
a teaching tool or for research, requires highly trained operators 
with a thorough understanding of simulation and the specific simu­
lator they are utilizing. In addition, a good navigational back­
ground is a must, as it is necessary to carry out the type of tasks 
radar simulators have been designed for. Both skills are also fun­
damental if, as a result of a casualty, a reconstruction work has 
to be done using the a simulator. Therefore the operator of a radar 
simulator is the most qualified person to conduct this part of the 
investigation process. As this task represents a very special field 
of application of radar simulators, and bearing in mind the diffe­
rent aspects of marine casualty investigation which have been ana­
lysed in this work, the operator must also be aware of a number of 
requirements which are particularly important for the succesful 
completion of the task. Those special requirements are;
(a) Knowledge of the existing national legislation about marine 
casualty investigation in the country, as well as a clear 
understanding of the methods and procedures used to carry out 
investigations.
(b) Objectiveness and impartiality in the analysis of the different 
aspects of a case, avoiding any bias in favour of one of the 
parties to the casualty. An impartial position will strengthen 
the conclusions reached at the end of the reconstruction work
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and consecjuently will be less subject to questioning.
(c) Awareness of the consequences of the findings and conclusions. 
The reconstruction process is not an academic exercise but an 
analysis of a real situation which is more than often conflic- 
tive. Its clarification is required with specific objectives 
and the conclusions may not only influence existing rules and 
regulations but also have consecuences on penal actions against 
individuals as well as on civil liability matters.
(d) Thorough knowledge of the hydrodynamic behaviour of ships, due 
tp the need to adapt the mathematical models in the simulator 
to the characteristics of the real ships involved. This is 
especially the case when insufficient data is available, which 
must therefore be complemented either with information from 
similar ships or by the judgement of the operator in order to 
generate suitable models.
(e) Understanding of human response to different situations. As the 
situation is today, more than often the balance of information 
available of a marine accident is more inclined towards unre­
liable and imprecise data than clear facts. Therefore, when 
carrying out the reconstruction of a case the operator of the 
simulator will have to make a number of assumptions which will 
be based on his judgement of the situation and thereafter an 
assessment of the possible course of events. His expertise as a 
navigator certainly plays a major role, but not less important 
is the consideration of the way in which the people involved in 
the case might have reacted faced to the real problem and as a 
result of their own perception of reality.
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The reconstruction of collisions at sea and groundings, which 
led in this project to the analysis of the utilization of radar 
simulators for that purpose, is a result of the requirement to 
establish the most probable course of events and the cause or cau­
ses of the accident. Insufficient information is a constant in many 
cases and therefore the desirability of having on board protected 
data recorders. Should the recorders become mandatory on board and 
depending on the way in which the information of the recorders will 
be presented to the investigating body, the need for an additional 
reconstruction might become irrelevant for the purpose of establi­
shing the circumstances of the accident if the recorder device 
itself is capable of providing the information. This question has 
still to be answered, which can only be done after the specifica­
tions and operational characteristics of the recorders have been 
established. In fact, the question forms an integral part with the 
consideration of the objectives of installing recording devices on 
board. However, it must be borne in mind that the data recorded may 
solve a particular case without any need of an extra reconstruction 
work, whilst the door is still open for two areas in which the 
radar simulator can play an important role, that is further 
research and teaching purposes.
In the field of research, the combination of a reliable data 
bank and simulation techniques can be utilized for a deeper ana­
lysis into different aspects of the causes of casualties with the 
objective of improving safety standards.
In the area of training, as it was considered in chapter 2, 
the dissemination of investigation reports should include maritime 
education and training institutes with the objective of carrying
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out the analysis of marine accident inquiries amongst those who in 
the future will con the ships. Cases of collisions and groundings 
at sea replayed in the radar simulator installed in maritime col­
leges provide an adequate tool to study the real circumstances in 
which an accident occurred. Whilst trainees can hardly be expected 
to increase their own experience by learning from the experience of 
others, at least a certain degree of awareness of the type of 
situations they might face in their professional life as well as an 
understanding of the causes which could lead to an accident can be 
achieved.
* * *
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APPENDIX I
MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF SHIP'S RESPONSE
Radar simulators must include in their software models descri­
bing the response of the ships to engine and helm orders. Advanced 
simulators provide for response to environmental influences as 
well. In this appendix, a brief analysis of the basic physical 
principles involved and simple mathematical solutions to the prob­
lem is made.
The ship's motion responds to the Newton's law of accelera­
tion, which states that the product of the mass and acceleration of 
a body is equal to the sum of forces acting upon it. Consecuently, 
a set of differential equations representing longitudinal, lateral 
and turning motion in a horizontal plane within a coordinate system 
as shown in figure A.1 can be written. The three equations are as 
follows:
(1) (m+mx).u' - (m+my).v.r = X
(2) (m + my).v' + (m + mx).u.r = Y
(3) (Iz + Jz).r' = N
where: m = mass of the vessel
mx= added mass along x axis 
my= added mass along y axis
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Iz= moment of inertia about z axis 
Jz= added moment of inertia about z axis 
u = speed of the vessel along x axis 
u'= acceleration along x axis
V = speed of the vessel along y axis 
v'= acceleration along y axis
r = turning rate 
r'= turning acceleration 
G = centre of gravity 
= rudder angle 
ijy = heading angle
X = sum of forces acting along x axis
Y = sum of forces acting along y axis 
N = sum of moments acting about z axis
figure A.1
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Equation (1) represents the movement of the ship along x axis, 
equation (2) the movement along axis y and equation (3) the turning 
motion. The added masses and moment of inertia account for the for­
ces and moment required to accelerate the liquid surrounding the 
ship.
The values of forces X and Y, and the moment N, are difficult 
to assess by hydrodynamic theory and a number of different analytic 
analyses have been made which are not conclusive yet. Another solu­
tion to the problem is to carry out experiments with models in 
towing tanks to predict the values for a given ship form. The solu­
tion of the set of equations provides both the longitudinal and 
transversal movement of the ship as well as the turning behaviour. 
However, being non-linear differential equations, due to the cha­
racter of the forces and moments, the solution is normally based on 
numerical methods.
Ship handling simulators, which require high accuracy of 
ship's response, make use of the hydrodynamic model. Sophisticated 
radar simulators are programmed with simplified versions of the 
differential equations, reproducing in many case the behaviour of 
selected ships. In a number of less advanced radar simulators, a 
simple model of ship's response has been adopted, following expo­
nential laws. The resulting expressions provide the speed of the 
vessel proceeding on a straight line, both while accelerating and 
decelerating, and the turning rate. The equations have the follo­
wing form;
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(4) V = (V2-V1).(1-exp(-t/TD) + VI
(5) V = (V2-V1).exp(-t/T1) + VI
(6) r = K.S.(l-exp(-t/T))
where: V = speed of the vessel on a straight line
VI= lower speed 
V2= higher speed 
r = turning rate 
($ = rudder angle 
K = coefficient 
T1,T= time constants
Equation (4) is used when the vessel is accelerating and equa­
tion (5) when decelerating. By inspecting these equations, it can 
be said that the change in speed of the ship as a result of an eng­
ine order is assumed to be exponential. On the other hand, it is 
also assumed that in all cases the ship will proceed straight until 
reaching the final speed. An analysis of speed curves of real ves­
sels shows that normally they do not follow an exponential law. 
However, by selecting an adequate value for the time constant T1, a 
good approximation can be generally obtained. As an example, figure 
A.2 shows the comparison of the speed decrease of a particular ves­
sel, in this case a coaster of 80 metres in length, with the values 
obtained by using equation (5). The test is based on three diffe­
rent initial speeds, and at t= 0 the engine was stopped. To obtain 
the calculated curves, in equation (5) the lower speed VI must be 
zero and the value 6.2 minutes was selected for T1. This time con­
stant should be called "equivalent time constant", because it is 
included in an empirical expression.
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A simple integration of equation (5) results in an expression 
which gives the distance run by the ship before stopping. If the 
stopping order is given at t = 0, the resulting equation is as fol­
lows:
(7) S = T1.(V2-V1).(1-exp(-t/T1)') + VI.t
where: 5 = distance run until stopping
In equation (7), t should be the time elapsed until the speed 
of the ship becomes zero. Also as an example, the calculation of
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distance run has been made for the same coaster mentioned before, 
assuming VI = - 6 knots (theoretical speed full astern) and T1 = 
5.6 minutes. In order to obtain the distance run, equation (5) was 
first used to calculate the time taken to stop the ship for various 
initial speeds and these times were introduced in equation (7). In 
figure A.3, the actual curve for the particular vessel is compared
with the calculated values.
If such type of curves are available for a given ship, the 
operator of a simulator programmed with this model can choose ade­
quate constants in the equations to obtain the best approximation. 
This represents a disadvantage in an investigation procedure.
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because of the need of real data of a kind, which is seldom avai­
lable when analysing a collision case. The second assumption, which 
is that the ship proceeds on a straight line, is not always valid. 
This is specially the case when the vessel reverses her engines and 
in those cases, therefore, an additional error will be introduced 
when using this type of mathematical models.
Equation (6), which provides the rate of turn, is the expres­
sion known as K-T equation and is the simplest mathematical model 
of ship steering, based on the Newton laws. K and T are the stee­
ring quality indices which can be assessed for a given ship by 
making steering tests. The equation shows that the turning rate 
increases exponentialy at the beguining and afterwards this increa­
se slows down until reaching the constant value:
r = K. ^
The simple exponential model does not provide for the reduc­
tion of speed which occurs during a turn and therefore it is nor­
mally included in the software as a programmable reduction expres­
sed in percentage of the speed before starting the turn.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ARPA
CGI
CPA
CRISTAL
FUND
GRT
ILO
IMO
MSC
SOLAS
TCPA
TDW
TOVALOP
VHF
VTS
Automatic radar plotting aids 
Computer generated imagery
Minimum distance at closest point of approach 
Contract Regarding Interim Supplement to Tanker 
Liability for Oil Pollution
International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollu­
tion Damage
Gross registered tonnage 
International Labour Organization 
International Maritime Organization 
IMO Maritime Safety Committee
International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea 
Time to closest point of approach 
Deadweight tonnage
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liabi­
lity for Oil Pollution Damage 
Very high frecuency transceiver 
Vessel traffic system
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